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Abstract
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The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) currently has a small supply of
nuclear weapons, and the country continues to develop its nuclear weapons capability through
advancement of its facilities and supplies. North Korea has violated several international
agreements in which the nation consented to being a nuclear-free state, but continued to test
missiles and expand its nuclear facilities. The DPRK’s nuclear weapons capability and testing
threatens the safety of the United States and its allies in East Asia. Since this issue has been
evolving for years and remains a priority in foreign affairs, the United States has developed and
is currently maintaining a policy of “Strategic Patience.” This thesis will present, persuade, and
explain the benefits and pitfalls for the enactment of a new policy entitled, “Chinese Chess.”
Chinese Chess is open bilateral dialogue between the United States and China to discuss future
plans for a denuclearized North Korea. This dissertation is composed of multiple memorandums,
in which information was received through news articles, official government documents,
published reports from non-profit organizations, statistical data, information from databases, and
interviews from experts in the field. Because North Korea’s nuclear program is of international
concern, this paper will also look at the perspectives and relations of other countries to this issue.

Capstone Summary
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“Chinese Chess” is a foreign policy I began working on in the fall 2013 semester through
the Maxwell in Washington Undergraduate Program. Through the Renée Crown University
Honors Program, I decided to expand my policy by researching the topic more in-depth and
interviewing experts. When creating a foreign policy, I would have presented my policy to the
National Security Council (NSC), the principal forum for foreign policy decision-making and a
mechanism for aligning key government agencies in the implementation of policy. In this case, I
will be presenting my policy to the Honors Capstone Board, which may decide if they would
“pass” my policy if they were on the NSC.
My policy addresses North Korea’s (Democratic People’s Republican of Korea [DPRK])
nuclear weapons program and how the United States can begin working towards ending it. In the
past, the United States and other actors in the international community sat down with North
Korea to negotiate the dismantlement of North Korea’s nuclear facilities. This meeting, known
as the Six Party Talks, was not too successful in disarming North Korea’s nuclear program
because the DPRK continued to expand its program and test missiles. Since the Six Party Talks
and North Korea’s continuous testing, President Barrack Obama has enacted the policy of
“Strategic Patience.” Even though my policy addresses the same issue that the policy Strategic
Patience is addressing, my policy strategy is more proactive than the current policy. I believe in
order to eventually dismantle North Korea’s entire nuclear program, the United States must work
with China. The United States and China are two extremely powerful nations and are huge actors
in this situation. The United States is a global hegemon, meaning the nation has a global
leadership position it needs to follow by staying involved in issues, such as North Korea’s
nuclear program and the tension it is causing in the East Asia region. As for China, the country
not only has the most dealings with North Korea, but it is the most powerful nation in the region.

By the United States and China having open conversations about the nuclear program, while
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simultaneously strengthening their own relationship with each other, the two nations should be
able to work together and eventually incorporate other nations to deal with North Korea. I will
advocate for and present research that supports Chinese Chess as a new approach and explain the
positive outcomes that will occur if my policy is enacted.
When I began my project, my main source of research came from news articles because
North Korea’s nuclear program is an ongoing issue of concern and the DPRK is an extremely
private nation that does not permit information to leave or enter the country without the Kim
regime’s approval. In addition to news articles, I have found some information from databases
that mostly cover North Korea’s history and past United States efforts. However, the bulk of my
research comes from U.S. government reports and interviews I conducted with experts. Most
reports are available online through different non-profit organizations, think tanks, government
documents. As for the interviews, all of my interviewees have worked with the North Koreans or
other actors in the region, or have expertise in international security or the East Asian region in
general. My policy is broken down into several memorandums. The shortest memos are the
options and actions memos because when a policymaker presents his/her policy to the NSC, the
memo itself describing the policy is supposed to be short. My options memo details other
potential options the United States could take in this situation with North Korea, and the actions
memo is my recommended policy. There are several interview memos, which present a summary
of the interviews I conducted. The interview memos explain the interviewees’ perspectives and
how they agreed or disagreed with my policy and other interviewees. There is also a public
opinion memo that covers statistical data about the public opinion of the appropriate actors in the
situation. For example, there is data about how much of a threat do Americans view North Korea

and its nuclear program. Finally, all these memos, except the options and actions memo, are a
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part of the “white paper.” The white paper portion of the memo is the longer explanation of the
policy and additional information about the issue. As previously mentioned, when presenting
government policies, they are supposed to be short; therefore, by having this white paper section,
additional information can be added to explain the policy and issue. For example, there will be
historical information about North Korea’s nuclear program and what policy was followed in the
past to address the situation.
The issue of North Korea’s nuclear program is a significant matter of foreign policy
because North Korea continues to make its presence known. Every so often, Americans and
other international actors hear in the news that North Korea tested another nuclear weapon or is
in the process of developing its nuclear program. Even though the United States is not
geographically situated in the East Asia, the United States still has troops in the region and close
allies, such as South Korea and Japan. The United States has made several agreements with its
allies that it will support any nation that is threatened by North Korea. East Asia is also a thriving
area economically and in foreign affairs; therefore, the United States should want to say active in
that region. In addition to these reasons, the United States is a global hegemon. It is the United
States’ duty to stay active in global situations such as these. The Kim regime’s North Korea may
have isolated itself, but it is certainly not a quiet and cooperative nation. Continuing what the
United States is doing now, simply sitting back and waiting for North Korea to make a move,
may seem to be working, but years from now, this strategy may fail. Even if the situation stays
the same for years, East Asian nations are vital components of US foreign policy and national
interest. Currently, North Korea might not seem to be a huge threat, but through working on this
issue with China now, we could potentially better relationships within the region, incorporate
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another nation (DPRK) into the international community, and work towards the unification of the
Korean Peninsula.
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unless it is requested (hence the length of the white paper portion). The white paper consists of
additional information the NSC or President might want to see if they had any questions. The
white paper overall contains information that helped the policy-maker develop the recommended
policy.

11
White Paper
Executive Summary:
The white paper portion of the policy, “Chinese Chess,” will cover the historical context
of the DPRK’s nuclear issue, critique the current United States policy of “Strategic Patience,”
examine the relationships among different stakeholders and their perspective on the issue, and
look at other policy options the United States could enact. After reviewing these areas, the white
paper will conclude that the policy of Chinese Chess is the best policy option for the United
States to adopt.
North Korea’s nuclear weapons program has been developing for years, but this is an
issue the United States should address now because several factors have been added or changed
to the situation. First, the allied relationships of China and North Korea is not as close as it has
been in the past for reasons such as China’s annoyance with the DPRK’s disobedience in
international agreements and North Korea’s lessened dependency on China for trade. The
leadership in North Korea has changed as well. Previous leader Kim Jong-il passed away in 2011
and his son, Kim Jong-un, became the Supreme Leader of North Korea. Kim Jong-un’s
leadership is different than his father’s in that he uses the tactic of fear more heavily in order to
maintain control. Recently, North Korea has been making agreements with other nations—such
as Japan, South Korea, and Russia—instead of going through China or the United States to have
discussions and agreements. Finally, North Korea is decreasing its imports of materials needed to
develop its nuclear program and instead, producing these essential elements domestically (CBS
News, 2013). North Korea will not only need less assistance to develop its nuclear program, but
the United States will have a more difficult time actually knowing the DPRK’s progress for its
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nuclear program. These newly developed factors makes the DPRK a different country in that the
current policy of “Strategic Patience” does not fit. Before the United States was dealing with a
North Korea that was governed by Kim Jong-il, extremely close with China, and completely

isolated from the international community. Today, North Korea is under new leadership. Having
disagreements with its closest ally China, North Korea is no longer completely isolated, as it
once was, and is able to expand its nuclear weapons program without the help from other
nations.
Even though North Korea’s nuclear weapons program is not an urgent issue for the
United States, it is still a problem the United States should begin to address. North Korea’s
nuclear weapons threaten not only the United States and its troops in the East Asia region, but
also the US allies in that region. The United States has agreements with nations, such as Japan
and South Korea, which bind the former to military assistance if Japan and South Korea were
ever threatened or attacked by another nation. North Korea’s nuclear weapons program also
threatens US leadership, its presence in the East Asia region, and negotiations particularly
regarding the DPRK’s denuclearization. The United States is risking a loss of leadership and
presence in the region because other nations are creating their own dialogue and treaties that do
not include or consult the United States. A loss of the United States’ interest in the DPRK’s
nuclear situation may also damage the relationships between the United States and East Asian
countries because the latter may believe that the United States has no interest in assisting them or
the international community as a whole. Therefore, if the United States does not begin to try to
denuclearize North Korea, the safety of the United States and its allies will be threatened, and the
United States will lose its dominance in the issue and region itself.
Historical Background:

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s (DPRK) nuclear and ballistic missile
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program has worried the international community, including the United States, since the Korean
War. Several strategies have been tried to end North Korea’s nuclear program, but none have
been successful in fully dismantling the program.
North Korea first began developing a nuclear weapons program in the early 1950s. In
December 1952, the DPRK created the Atomic Energy Research Institute and the Academy of
Sciences, along with cooperative agreements with the Soviet Union (“North Korea Nuclear,”
2014). In the 1960s, the Soviet Union assisted North Korea in constructing the Yongbyon
Nuclear Research Center, a Soviet IRT-2000 nuclear research reactor, and additional facilities
(“History of North Korea,” 2015). With these installations, North Korea was able to produce
radioisotopes and train personnel for the beginning preparations of nuclear weapons. From this
point forward, leader Kim Il-Sung controlled the nuclear program and its development.
North Korea continued to expand its nuclear program through educational and research
institutions. By the 1970s, North Korea expanded its IRT-2000 research reactor and began to
acquire plutonium-reprocessing technology from the Soviet Union (“History of North Korea,”
2015). This process separated usable plutonium and uranium for prefabrication into fuel for the
use of nuclear weapons (“North Korea Nuclear,” 2014). North Korea began to expand its nuclear
program immensely in the 1980s through its construction of uranium milling facilities, a fuel rod
fabrication complex, a 5MW(e) nuclear reactor, and research and development institutions.
North Korea also began experimenting with high explosives tests that helped in building the
triggering mechanism of a nuclear bomb (“Getting to Normal: The Six Party” 2012: 4). Even
though the DPRK continued to develop its nuclear program, in December 1985, Pyongyang
signed the Treaty of the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as a non-nuclear weapon

state (Jones, 2013). The international treaty’s objective is to prevent the spread of nuclear
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weapons and technology in order to promote cooperation for the peaceful use of nuclear energy
(“Getting to Normal: The Six Party,” 2012: 4). Only five nations, the same nations who are
permanent members on the United Nation Security Council (the United States, China, France,
United Kingdom, and Russia) are allowed to possess nuclear weapons. The agreement of the
treaty allows these nations to have nuclear weapons; however, they are not allowed to threaten
other non-nuclear states, one of the few benefits of joining the treaty. In 1991, North Korea and
South Korea signed the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, in
which both nations promised “not to test, manufacture, produce, receive, possess, store, deploy,
or use nuclear weapons… remove nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities,” and
conduct “bilateral inspections” (“History of North Korea,” 2015). However, the two nations
never decided on the agreement’s implementation.
Agreements between North Korea and the international community became more
complicated and began to create tension in the 1990s. On January 30, 1992, North Korea signed
with the International Atomic Energy Agency’s safeguards (IAEA), an international organization
that promotes the peaceful use of nuclear energy (“Fact Sheet on DPRK,” 2014). Under this
agreement, North Korea submitted an initial report to the IAEA about its nuclear facilities and
inventory and allowed IAEA inspectors to visit these facilities and confirm North Korea’s
“initial declaration.” North Korea claimed to have a small amount of resources and supplies that
would not be sufficient to create nuclear weapons. In May 1992, six rounds of IAEA inspections
began and confirmed part of North Korea’s initial report; although, the country denied the IAEA
access to two suspect nuclear waste sites (“Fact Sheet on DPRK,” 2014). Due to the access
denial to the waste sites, the IAEA asked the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to
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authorize their inspections and consequently, which triggered North Korea to withdraw from the
NPT on March 12, 1993 (“Fact Sheet on DPRK,” 2014). Because withdrawal from the NPT
requires 90 days to take effect, the United States entered bilateral negotiations with North Korea
in order to change the DPRK’s mind about leaving the NPT (“North Korea Nuclear,” 2014).
Pyongyang eventually decided to postpone its withdrawal while negotiating with Washington;
however, North Korea continued to deny inspections to verify its nuclear activities (“North

Korea Nuclear,” 2014). During these bilateral negotiations, North Korea continued to operate its
5MW(e) reactor in Yongbyon and removed the reactor’s spent fuel rods without the IAEA’s
supervision (“Fact Sheet on DPRK,” 2014). These actions worsened tensions with the United
States because “the random placement of the spent fuel rods in a temporary storage pond
compromises our [IAEA] capacity to reconstruct the operational history of the reactor, which
could have used in effort to account for the discrepancies in Pyongyang’s reported plutonium
processing” (“North Korea Nuclear,” 2014). In response to the country’s actions, the United
States asked the UNSC to enact economic sanctions on the North Korea (“North Korea Nuclear,”
2014). In June 1994, tension began to increase because North Korea viewed the United States’
sanctions as a hostile act. After bilateral talks, Kim Il-Sung agreed to negotiations of freezing
certain parts of its nuclear facilities, removing sources, and implementing the North-South Joint
Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula (“History of North Korea,” 2015).
In return, the United States had to construct light water power reactors for the DPRK and provide
a certain amount of heavy fuel oil per year until North Korea’s own reactor began working in
2003 (“Fact Sheet on DPRK,” 2014). The United States also had to assure that the nation would
not threaten the DPRK with nuclear weapons. These agreements became known as the “Agreed
Framework” of 1994.

The Agreed Framework lasted for about a decade; despite the arrangement, both
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countries did not like what the agreement was accomplishing. The United States was annoyed
that the inspections of North Korea’s nuclear facilities were taking an extremely long time, and
North Korea was frustrated with the United States’ delay of building the light water power
reactors (CBS News, 2013). In 2001, President George W. Bush reviewed the Agreed Framework
policy and decided that the United States should seek “improved implementation of the Agreed
Framework, verify constraints on North Korea’s missile program, ban missile exports, and create
a less threatening North Korean conventional military posture” (“North Korea Nuclear,” 2014).
This new decision also meant North Korea must allow all inspections in order to confirm the
nation’s nuclear past. At the same time, the international community also became worried and
suspicious that the DPRK had an illegal highly enriched uranium (HEU) program. In the summer
of 2002, the United States discovered that Pakistan exchanged HEU technology for ballistic
missiles technology with North Korea (“History of North Korea,” 2015). Later in October 2002,
North Korean officials admitted to the HEU program, but later changed their statement claiming
to only have a plan to produce nuclear weapons (“North Korea Nuclear,” 2014). Frustrated with
the DPRK’s antagonism, the United States suspended heavy oil shipments. In response to this oil
suspension, North Korea lifted the freezes on its nuclear facilities established in the Agreed
Framework, removed IAEA inspectors, and withdrew from the NPT in January 2003 (“Fact
Sheet on DPRK,” 2014).
This nuclear crisis with North Korea continued in 2003 when the United States
discovered North Korea’s Radiochemistry Laboratory that reprocessed spent fuel rods (“History
of North Korea,” 2015). It was later confirmed by the United States and North Korea Foreign
Ministry that North Korea had finished reprocessing the spent fuel, which would give the

country enough plutonium for about six nuclear devices (“North Korea Nuclear,” 2014). From
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April 2003 to September 2005 a multilateral dialogue between the United States, North Korea,
South Korea, China, Russia, and Japan, known as the Six Party Talks, occurred with the
intention of ending the North Korean nuclear weapons program. At the conclusion of the Six
Party Talks, all parties signed a “Statement of Principles” in which North Korea agreed to get rid
of its nuclear weapons program, return to the NPT and the IAEA, and implement the 1992 Joint
Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula (“North Korea Nuclear,” 2014).
The United States also had to state that it would not attack North Korea with nuclear or
conventional weapons and that it did not have any nuclear weapons in South Korea. Even though
the Statement of Principles was signed, it was never respected. Following the signing, the United
States and North Korea began to have disagreements over the interpretation of the Statement of
Principles. For example, North Korea believed the statement allowed the nation to have light
water power reactors, but the United States disagreed claiming that the DPRK must first halt its
nuclear weapons program (“History of North Korea,” 2015). North Korea maintained that it
would not end its nuclear weapons program until the United States removed previous sanctions
with the Banco Delta Asia Bank, located in South Asia and accused of assisting North Korea
with its illegal transactions (“North Korea Nuclear,” 2014). These conflicts led to the Statement
of Principles never being fully executed.
In October 2006, North Korea had its first nuclear test; however, the test was not
successful in that the missile did not reach the level of kilotons that was expected (“History of
North Korea,” 2015). Following the test, the United Nations Security Council enacted the UNSC
Resolution 1718 that imposed sanctions on North Korea (“North Korea Nuclear,” 2014). The Six

Party Talks convened again in February 2007, and participating countries agreed on the “Initial
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Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement.” In the statement, North Korea agreed to
relinquish its nuclear weapons, as well as its nuclear weapons program, and return to the NPT
and IAEA within 60 days (United States, Congress, United Nations Security Council, 2006: 1).
The Six Party Talks members would also have to assist North Korea with its energy needs, and
the United States would have to release North Korean assets at the Banco Delta Asia Bank. From
February to July 2007, North Korea began shutting down facilities and working with the IAEA;
therefore, North Korea’s progress led the Six Party Talks to adopt the Second Action Plan. The
Second Action Plan required North Korea to completely disable its nuclear facilities and submit
a declaration regarding its nuclear weapons program dismantlement by December 31, 2007
(United States, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2007: 1). Instead, North Korea submitted its
declaration on June 26, 2008, six months after the due date. North Korea failed to mention in its
declaration its uranium enrichment program and its nuclear cooperation with other nations,
including Pakistan and Syria (“North Korea Nuclear,” 2014).
Negotiations from this point forward became more complicated, and North Korea
continued to go back and forth on its words and actions. The United States delayed its promise of
removing North Korea from its terrorism list; therefore, North Korea delayed its own promises,
restored its nuclear facilities in Yongbyon, and removed inspectors from accessing its nuclear
sites (“Facts Sheet on DPRK,” 2014). Even though the United States did eventually remove
North Korea from its terrorism list in 2008, and the Six Party Talks recommenced for
negotiations, North Korea continued to advance its nuclear program and ignore negotiations. On
May 25, 2009, North Korea conducted its second nuclear test, which the nation considered to

be more successful than the first test. Pyongyang announced that it would continue to process
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uranium and that the DPRK did not intend on returning to the Six Party Talks (“History of North
Korea,” 2015).
From 2010 to 2011, North Korea continued to make claims to China that it would work
towards denuclearization efforts, but at the same time, North Korea engaged in several military
conflicts with South Korea (“North Korea Nuclear,” 2014). In March 2010, North Korea
torpedoed a South Korean ship and in November 2010, North Korea shelled Yeonpyeong Island,
both incidents led to the death of many military personnel and civilians (“North Korea Nuclear,”
2014). In March 2011, North Korea wanted to return to the Six Party Talks and discuss its
uranium enrichment program; yet, at the same time, the nation completed its uranium enrichment
facility in Yongbyon and announced the construction of a light water power reactor (“Getting to
Normal: The Six Party,” 2012: 5).
Leader Kim Jong-il died in December 2011 and his son Kim Jong-un took over role of
Supreme Leader of North Korea. Six Party Talks occurred again on February 29, 2012, when
North Korea agreed to temporarily stop its nuclear testing, uranium enrichment, and long-range
missile tests in exchange for food aid. This exchange became known as the “Leap Day
Agreement” (Goodby and Gross, 2010). However, the United States stopped sending food aid on
April 12, 2012, when the DPRK launched an orbit using an Unha Rocket (“North Korea
Nuclear,” 2014). The missile launch was a violation of UN Security Council Resolutions 1718
and 1874 because the rocket’s materials are the same as a long-range ballistic missile. North
Korea launched another rocket and successfully placed a satellite into orbit in December 2012
(“History of North Korea,” 2015). As a result of this launching, the UN Security Council
demanded North Korea end its nuclear missile program. On February 12, 2013, North Korea
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conducted a third nuclear test, which the nation considered to be a successful “light, miniaturized
atomic bomb” (“History of North Korea,” 2015). In April 2013, North Korea restarted its 5MW
graphite-moderated reactor and uranium enrichment plant in Yongbyon (“North Korea Nuclear,”
2014). In March 2014, there were major excavations for a water supply to provide water and
energy for the light water reactor’s cooling system (“History of North Korea,” 2015). North
Korea also announced in March 2014 that it would be conducting a new type of nuclear testing
known as salvo testing. Even though North Korea made these announcements, satellite imagery
has shown that the Yongbyon Nuclear Research Center and Pyunggye-ri Nuclear Test Facility
has shown little activity since April 2014 (“North Korea Nuclear,” 2014).

Critique of Current Policy:
“Strategic Patience”
In 2009, the Obama Administration decided to enact the policy of “Strategic Patience” to
handle North Korea’s nuclear weapons program because the administration believes the United
States could wait for North Korea to make a decision about denuclearization and then act
accordingly (Snyder, 2013). Since North Korea kept breaking the agreements made during the
Six Party Talks, created military conflicts with South Korea, and recently had little progress with
its nuclear facilities, the Obama Administration felt it was best to wait for North Korea to decide
on denuclearization. In 2010 Former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton explained the
administration’s justification for Strategic Patience, “Current sanctions will not be relaxed until
Pyongyang takes verifiable, irreversible steps towards complete denuclearization” (Gard, 2013).
Since the DPRK has been consistently unfaithful to past agreements, the Obama Administration
feels it is best to wait for North Korea to make tangible changes towards denuclearization before

the United States again enters negotiations. Until concrete changes are made towards
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disarmament, the United States will keep the current United Nations sanctions on North Korea.
In 2009 President Barrack Obama explains, “I want to break the cycle of provocation, extortion,
and reward that various US administrations had confronted and ultimately accommodated in the
past fifteen years” (Gard, 2013).
The Critique
The main problem critics have with Strategic Patience is the United States’ inaction
throughout North Korea’s nuclear development. Since the Obama Administration has enacted
this policy, North Korea has conducted three nuclear tests, launched two satellites (one of which
was successful), and created deadly military conflicts with South Korea (Snyder, 2013). The
Brookings Institute refers to Strategic Patience as “Strategic Passivity” and explains that the
United States is “supporting the status quo rather than encouraging change” (Goodby and Gross,
2010). By the United States waiting on North Korea to make a decision and giving broad
concepts of peace and cooperation, the Obama Administration has lost initiative (Goodby and
Gross, 2010). Despite the international communities’ concerns and wishes, the DPRK is a
nuclear state, and it seems the international community has accepted North Korea’s ways in
reaction to Strategic Patience. For example, Japan is conducting its own negotiations with North
Korea to protect themselves from the DPRK’s nuclear weapons. China and South Korea also
continue to trade with North Korea. The Obama Administration claims that Strategic Patience
will lead North Korea into complete isolation, to the point where it will have to denuclearize in
order to maintain the well being of its nation; thus far this assertion is not materializing,
particularly in consideration of other nations’ current relations with the DPRK (Goodby and
Gross, 2010). Critics believes Strategic Patience makes the United States appear weak, almost as

if they are assisting North Korea in building its nuclear arms. When there are no negotiations,
there is no progress and the issue cannot be put to rest (Gard, 2013).
Critics also claim that Strategic Patience is overall not a coherent policy. There is no clear
plan as to what the United States is waiting for other than sincere actions by the DPRK toward
its denuclearization. The Obama Administration explains these actions can be minor or big, but
either way, the United States will respond in a similar manner (“History of North Korea,” 2015).
There is also no explanation in policy regarding North Korea’s actions. What if North Korea
tests another missile or attacks the United States’ ally South Korea? With Strategic Patience, the
United States is theoretically not supposed to do anything. There are no “red lines” outlined for
North Korea’s actions in Strategic Patience, and that is a problem (Goodby and Gross, 2010).
Due to Strategic Patience’s lack of guidelines, critics feel that North Korea will only get stronger
to a point where the United States will have no choice but to give up this policy and intervene.
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An Options Memorandum represents an initial national security memo designed

to examine various policy options before deciding on a course of action. It consists of a
summary of the problem, background information about what has been occurring, options
to address the issue, and recommended next steps the President should take prior to
making a decision. If approved by the NSC, an action memo would be created next. The
options memo and the action memo are supposed to be to short as they are presented to
high-ranking officials with a lack of time.

Options Memorandum:
For: Executive Secretary, NSC
From: Jolene Sproviero
Subject: North Korea’s Developing Nuclear Program
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Summary:
North Korea continues to develop its nuclear program by disobeying the UN Security
Council and negating any agreements made with nations. North Korea’s nuclear program is an
important issue for the United States because our national security is at risk. North Korea
continues to test its missiles and has been accused of weapons proliferation to countries like Iran
and Syria. In dealing with this issue, the Untied States could enact tougher sanctions on North
Korea, pressure China into disciplining North Korea more harshly, or resume the Six Party
Talks. North Korea’s nuclear dispute has been occurring over a decade and does not need to be
acted upon immediately; however, it is still an important issue that needs to be carefully analyzed
in order to properly respond to the situation and ensure the US national security interests for the
future.
Background:
North Korea’s developing nuclear program is an important issue for the United States
because in the past decade, since the Six Party Talks ended, North Korea’s hostility towards the
international community has increased. In 2009 after North Korea claimed the talks were “dead,”
North Korea admitted to having a nuclear program that would begin testing (“Getting to Normal:
The Six Party,” 2012: 1). In 2010, North Korea launched attacks on South Korea’s island of
Yeonpyeon and its ship the Cheonan. In 2011, Kim Jong-un replaced his father, Kim Jong-il, as
North Korea’s Supreme Leader continuing in his father’s nuclear footsteps. On February 12,
2012 North Korea and the United States made an agreement to halt the nuclear program in
exchange for nutritional aid; although, North Korea broke that agreement on April 13, 2012

when it tested a nuclear missile. Nuclear tests occurred again on December 12, 2012 and on
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February 12, 2013. The February 2013 test claimed to be “targeted” at the United States and was
considered the most successful test yet (“Getting to Normal: The Six Party,” 2012: 2). North
Korea’s past three Supreme Leaders, including Kim Jong-un, have performed in the same
manner of creating optimism that denuclearization is possible but then simultaneously continuing
the DPRK’s nuclear development (“Getting to Normal: The Six Party,” 2012: 2).
Options:
As a possible option, the United States could add tougher sanctions on North Korea.
These sanctions will make it more difficult for North Korea to pay for materials to develop its
nuclear program (Gladstone and Sanger, 2013: 1). In the past when the UN Security Council
enacted sanctions and other demands, North Korea reacted by testing more missiles. The DPRK
did not respond or even fear the sanctions. Another possible pitfall for the sanctions is their cost.
The United States needs to preserve its capital for future potential conflicts and by spending
more money now, because the United States might not have sufficient funds for later conflicts
(Gladstone and Sanger, 2013: 2).
A second option for the United States is to put pressure on China by making the North
Korea situation a top priority for US-China relations (Fisher, 2013: 1). China is North Korea’s
lifeline for supplies, such as fuel and food (Fisher, 2013: 1). If China reduced its assistance, then
North Korea’s nuclear program would struggle to develop and its people would suffer; therefore,
North Korea might be forced to corporate with the international community in order to improve
living conditions. A possible pitfall in this scenario is a damaged US-China relationship if the
two states do not agree on matters. The North Korea situation may come at the expense of other
priorities between the United States and China (Fisher, 2013: 2).
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A third option for the Untied States is to resume the Six Party Talks. If the United States
is reassured that North Korea is genuinely ready to negotiate, then the talks can finally lead to
proper negotiations that are fulfilled by all parties (Sang-Hun, 2013: 1). Although, the United
States risks repeating history. In the past Six Party Talks, North Korea tricked states into
negotiations while simultaneously continuing to develop its nuclear program.
Next steps:
Since the North Korea situation is not urgent but still important, the Obama
Administration needs to answer the following question before making a decision: Is North
Korea’s recent behavior an indication that it is ready to properly negotiate, or is the nation up to

its old tricks again? If North Korea is genuine and appears to be halting its nuclear development,
then renewed Six Party Talks might be an option; however, the United States risks deception
again by North Korea. On the other hand, if North Korea continues to act hostilely and further
develops its nuclear program, then enacting tougher sanctions or pressuring China become the
better options because North Korea will not properly negotiate. However, with these options, the
United States risks wasting capital or damaging relations with China. The United States needs to
determine North Korea’s future intentions for its nuclear weapons program and possible
negotiations with the international community.
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An Action Memorandum outlines the recommended policy that would be sent through
the chain of command within the NSC before being sent to the President for a decision. The

memo consists of a summary of the current issue and the policy, the background of the issue, the
recommended policy and an explanation as to why the policy should be implemented, and the
recommended actions if this policy was accepted. If the NSC approves the policy, it will be
passed to the President for a final decision. As previously mentioned, the action memo is
purposely designed to be short as well.

Action Memorandum
For: Executive Secretary, NSC
From: Jolene Sproviero
Subject: Going Through China to get to North Korea – “Chinese Chess”
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Summary:
North Korea continues to develop its nuclear program by disobeying the United Nations
Security Council and negating any agreements made with the international community. In order
to ensure our national security interests, the United States needs to confront North Korea’s
lifeline: China. The United States should pressure China by making the North Korean nuclear
situation a top priority for US-China relations. President Obama should have an open discussion
with President Xi Jinping about strict intervention with North Korea, which will serve U.S.
national security interests because if China becomes more involved, North Korea’s lifeline
would be threatened and its nuclear development could finally come to an end (Bajoria and Xu,
2013).
Background:
The United States Government should consider the new policy of pressuring China to
intervene more with North Korea because not only is US national security at risk, but there is
also a new factor that weakens current U.S. policy. North Korea is decreasing its imports of
essential elements needed for its nuclear program as it is producing its essential components
domestically (CBS News, 2013). Previously, the United States and the international community
have dealt with North Korea’s nuclear development mostly with strict sanctions (“Getting to
Normal: The Six Party,” 2012: 2). If North Korea stops importing nuclear materials, the United
States cannot catch the former in its nuclear act; consequently, the use of sanctions on North
Korea will no longer be effective (CBS News, 2013).

North Korea’s nuclear program is not an urgent matter; however, the United States
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should begin pressuring and having talks with China in order to improve US national security
outlook for the future. North Korea’s nuclear program is developing more efficiently.
Eventually, North Korea will no longer need to import materials for its nuclear program due to
its domestic production (CBS News, 2013). Previous strategies of sanctions, the reduction of aid,
and Six Party Talks have failed in the past; therefore, with a new factor to consider, the United
States should try a new policy of working with China to determine a plan of strict intervention
with North Korea (“Getting to Normal: The Six Party,” 2012: 3).
Recommended Policy: “Chinese Chess”
If the United States pressures China to intervene more stringently with North Korea, the
United States would have the advantage of attacking North Korea’s lifeline. About 90% of North
Korea’s energy supply, approximately 45% of its food supply, and a percentage of additional
food aid are all imported from China (Bajoria and Xu, 2013). Even though the United States has
given and cut aid to North Korea, the majority of North Korea’s economy depends on China. If
China were to reduce is assistance, North Korea’s people and nuclear program would struggle to
survive; therefore, North Korea would be forced to cooperate with China’s demands in order to
improve its living conditions (Bajoria and Xu, 2013).
Another advantage to pressuring China is the current, weakened relationship between
China and North Korea (Carpenter, 2013). China and North Korea are no longer “as close as lips
and teeth”; therefore, it is the perfect time for the United States to begin to make some headway
(Carpenter, 2013). Due to North Korea’s disobedience with its nuclear program, the country has
created more problems for China to fix (Carpenter, 2013). For example, the United States has
increased the amount of troops in the region and joint military exercises with South Korea,
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Japan, and Vietnam because of North Korea’s nuclear threats (Meredith, 2013: 1). China views
these actions with mixed emotions because even though the United States is in the region to

promote stability, it is sometimes seen as containing China’s growing influence (Meredith, 2013:
3). As a rising power, China does not want additional military forces in the region to interfere
with its growth; however, North Korea is causing the United States to increase its presence in
order to protect its own national security (Carpenter, 2013). China is concerned with its growth
as a nation and how North Korea’s disobedience is affecting that growth; thus it will now be
easier for the United States to persuade China about strict intervention, as the alliance between
the two Asian countries has weakened, causing China to be more willing to intervene (Meredith,
2).
Even though pressuring China has its advantages, the US faces the disadvantage of a
possible damaged US-China relationship. By making the North Korea situation a top priority for
US-China relations, the United States risks jeopardizing other deals with China (Evron, 2013: 1).
Future deals regarding trade, joint military exercises, or even similar nuclear situations may be
negatively influenced (Evron, 2013: 1).
Tension between the United States and China may also cause issues for other
international concerns. For example, the United States and China are two of the five permanent
members of the UN Security Council with veto power. A poor relationship between the United
States and China might affect what resolutions are passed in the future (Evron, 2013: 1). China
could veto US sponsored resolutions or U.S. favored resolutions (or vice versa) on a given
situation due to heightened tensions caused by debates about North Korea (Evron, 2013: 2). The
tensions between the United States and China would create gridlock in the UN Security Council
and prevent resolutions from being passed.

The United States’ public has expressed great concern for North Korea’s nuclear
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development. Before North Korea’s most recent nuclear test in February 2013, Gallup conducted
a survey and concluded that 83% of Americans consider North Korea’s nuclear development a
critical threat to United States national security interests (Jones, 2013). Both Republicans and
Democrats are concerned with North Korea’s nuclear program as well; however, Republicans
would be more in favor for the policy of pressuring China than Democrats. Republicans in both
the House and the Senate have expressed their interest in working with China to end North
Korea’s threats. Many Republicans believe China provides great leverage to use against North
Korea because China is North Korea’s lifeline (Broder, 2013). On the other hand, Democrats and
President Obama believe this situation is an international issue that should be handled within the
UN Security Council (Broder, 2013). President Obama also believes the situation would be
contained best if the Untied States waits for North Korea to make tangible actions before
returning to dialogue; hence, his policy of Strategic Patience (Broder, 2013).
China would be both a supporter and an opponent of the policy. China recognizes the
DPRK’s nuclear program as a problem and the United States as a global hegemon; therefore,
working with the United States is in the best interest of both the United States and China. China
also would not be opposed to talking with the United States because the dialogue would just be
open conversations and no binding agreements. However, China also fears destabilizing Kim
Jong-un’s regime (Bajoria and Xu, 2013). China understands its vital role in the North Korean
conflict, but it also has to keep in mind the potential repercussions if China oversteps its
boundaries. If China intervenes too strictly with North Korea, the former could face problems on
the border with refugees and humanitarian crises (Broder, 2013). China believes containing

North Korea’s nuclear program and intervening only to a certain amount, is the best way to
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satisfy both the international community and itself (Bajoria and Xu, 2013).
Recommended Actions:
The first step to advance the new US policy of Chinese Chess is for President Obama to
reach out to President Xi Jinping and have an open discussion about North Korea’s nuclear
program. By beginning with a simple conversation, President Obama can get an idea as to how
President Xi Jinping would feel about strict intervention with North Korea (Meredith, 2013: 1).
If this exchange goes well, the next step is to expand the dialogue by inviting Secretary of State
John Kerry, Party Secretary of State Council Li Keqiang, and other Six Party members to further
consider ideas. The initial discussion between the two presidents is important because this opens
up dialogue on the specific situation; however, as a cautionary note, President Obama must be
careful of what he says in order to not insult President Xi Jinping and give the impression that
the United States is trying to control China’s rise as a nation (Bajoria and Xu, 2013). If President
Obama were too aggressive or were to offend President Xi Jinping in any way, it would be more
difficult for the United States to pressure China because the original conversation created tension
instead of openness (Bajoria and Xu, 2013). President Obama must be charismatic and open
minded in order for President Xi Jinping to even consider the idea of strict intervention or any
other future plans regarding North Korea (Broder, 2013).

White Paper (continued)
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International Relationships and Positions:
China
The Obama Administration’s current policy involving China is known as the “Pivot to
Asia.” The administration explains the policy as a “strategic rebalancing” towards East Asia in
which the United States focuses on economic, diplomatic, and military relations in that region
(Schiavenza, 2013). For example, the United States has brought up an economic proposal called
the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). It is a free trade agreement that consists of twelve countries
and also links a number of Asia-Pacific countries (Schiavenza, 2013). The Obama
Administration talks about how George W. Bush focused so intently on the Middle East that the
United States has forgotten about Asia and its growth; therefore, the Pivot to Asia focuses on the
region’s development.
According to the United States, this policy appears to be a positive agenda in order to
reconnect with Asia; however, China does not always view the Pivot to Asia in this way. The
United States and China are not enemies, yet the two nations are not complete allies either; they
are competitors. The United States is a global hegemon with the largest economy in the world,
but China is not far behind the United States. China has the second largest economy in the world
and is one of the most influential global powers, with its roles as a veto-power in the United
Nations and as a nuclear state in the NPT. With its dominance and growing power, China
sometimes views the Pivot to Asia as a check on its power. China is aggressive in its economy,
military, and expanding relations with other nations; therefore, China feels the United States
“rebalance” or “refocus” to Asia is not a friendly gesture, but the reaction of a worried
competitor (Harner, 2014). For example, President Obama’s military plan in the Pivot to Asia is
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to deploy 60% of American air and sea power to Asia by 2020 (Harner, 2014). The United States
also has several defense treaties with allies, such as Japan, South Korea and the Philippines, that
bind the United States to defend its allies if any military conflicts were to occur. These treaties
purposely exclude China. In relation to these treaties and general military concerns, the United

States has bases in the East Asia region, specifically South Korea and Guam, in which the United
States conducts military practices with these countries (Harner, 2014). From China’s perspective,
it seems that the United States is militarily building up its forces against China. China feels the
military pressure and also believes the United States may intervene in China’s issues. There have
been territorial conflicts in the East Asia region between China, Vietnam, the Philippines,
Malaysia, and Brunei over the Spratlys, Paracels, and other islands in regards to ownership. This
is an issue involving only countries in the region, and China does not want the United States
becoming involved.

Besides the United States’ general military presence, China is also concerned with the
United States’ national missile defense, as it is building up its ballistic missile defense
capabilities (BMD), which may indicate that the US sees Iran and China as potential threats
(Colby and Denmark, 2013: 7). China fears that this situation may be due, in part, by China’s
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own nuclear developments. The United States has tried to make clear that its BMD development
is not intended to negate China’s nuclear deterrent capability, but China is still worried (Colby
and Denmark, 2013: 8).

Even though at times the United States and China view each other as competitors, the two
nations agree on the importance of a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula. China and North Korea have
been allies for years, but in more recent history, China feels that it is constantly cleaning up
North Korea’s messes (Perlez, 2014: 1). China does not want to completely abandon North
Korea, but it also does not want to constantly deal with the DPRK either. China is concerned that
if North Korea continues to worry about its nuclear program and not focus on other areas of
interest, such as the nation’s food insecurity or energy crisis, the regime will collapse (Perlez,
2014: 2). The collapsing of the regime will lead to a flood of North Korean refugees over the
Chinese border, an issue China is not ready to handle (Perez, 2014: 2). This concern also leads to
issues with the United States. A collapse of the regime could mean a unified Korea and a new,
strong relationship between the United States and Korean Peninsula that excludes China.
Overall though, the United States and China have had several meetings regarding North
Korea’s nuclear development and general well being as a nation. Based on common interests and
goals, the United States and China have discussed and agreed on issues with North Korea, such
as a defense plan against a nuclear conflict and the distribution of energy and food aid, in
addition to assisting the DPRK’s economy in regards to trade (Glaser and Bajpaee, 2007). When
the discussion was focused on the DPRK’s nuclear weapons program, China was able to explain
North Korea’s reasons for development and DPRK’s perceptions of the United States. North
Korea sees the United States as a threat in the region, but North Korea also sees the United States
as a type of ally. The United States is a global hegemon with an immense amount of power;

therefore, North Korea wants this global hegemon to pay attention and work with the DPRK,
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even if that means broken promises in nuclear dismantlement (Glaser and Bajpaee, 2007). The
United States and China may be global competitors, but both nations want a nuclear-free DPRK.
Japan
The United States and Japan are allies with common interests regarding the Asia-Pacific
region’s overall stability and have formed several treaties due to their mutual interests. The two
nations have a stable economic relationship with one another, and the United States is permitted
to have American troops stationed in certain Japanese territories (Xu, 2014). The United States
and Japan also have similar objectives regarding North Korea’s nuclear weapons program
because Japan is worried, as is the United States, about possible nuclear conflicts and wants a
nuclear free Korean peninsula. The difference between the United States and Japan is that Japan
is geographically closer to North Korea and could be reached with a missile, and North Korea
has already tested several missiles that have entered Japan’s airspace (Xu, 2014). Even though
the United States and Japan have a military alliance, in the past, the United States has worked
without Japan when negotiating with North Korea and even disregarded Japan’s specific
concerns. Recently in light of the Obama Administration’s Strategic Patience, Japan is worried
that the United States will accept a nuclear North Korea, and Japan will have additional security
threats to deal with without help from the United States (Xu, 2014). Japan is concerned that if
North Korea is not a nuclear threat specifically to the United States, then the United States will
have no interest in Japan’s potential nuclear conflict with North Korea.
Japan has a role in this issue due to its geographical location and relationship with the
United States; however, Japan does not have much leverage when conducting bilateral
negotiations with North Korea or negotiations in the Six Party Talks. One main leverage Japan

has with North Korea is its strong economy; however, due to the UN Security Council’s
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sanctions and Japan’s own ban on certain economic activities with North Korea due to missile
testing, the leverage of economics is harder for Japan to utilize (Xu, 2014). A possible leverage
that is currently being used by Japan is a type of trade agreement in exchange for North Korea’s
denuclearization or more realistically an agreement that North Korea will not threaten Japan with
nuclear missiles. Due to Japan’s weaker role, the nation has revaluated the situation in order to
protect itself. Therefore, when Kim Jong-un took over as Supreme Leader, Japan improved its
military capability in order to withstand this new and “unpredictable” North Korea and
strengthened its support for UN Security Council Sanctions on North Korea (Xu, 2014).
Russia
As another member of the Six Party Talks, Russia wants a denuclearized North Korea as
well. However, recently, Russia and North Korea have been having bilateral talks and Kim Jongun plans on traveling to Russia to meet with President Vladimir Putin in May 2015
(Herszenhorn, 2015). In March 2015, the Russian Foreign Ministry announced an agreement
between the DPRK in which the two nations designated 2015 as a “Year of Friendship” since the
international community treats North Korea as an outcast (Herszenhorn, 2015). This Year of
Friendship is intended to bring Russia and DPRK relations “in political, economic, humanitarian,
and other areas to a new level” (Herszenhorn, 2015). The two nations have already planned for
several delegations and cultural events in cities such as Moscow and Pyongyang. Russia and
North Korea have also began discussing and enacting various economic initiatives. For example,
Russian businesses that conduct trade with North Korea can make payments in rubles through
North Korea’s Foreign Trade Bank (Kang, 2015). By using rubles, the two countries estimated
this worth would be one billion dollars by the year 2020. Russia also is interested in establishing

a bridgehead for expanding economic dealings with South Korea and Japan through the
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construction of the Eurasia Rail and Trans-Korean Railway that would connect North and South
Korea to Russia (Kang, 2015). There are also talks occurring about a trans-Siberian railway that
would run through North Korea to South Korea to allow Russia to export gas and electricity to
South Korea (Talmadge, 2015).
It may seem random that Russia is all of a sudden becoming friendly with North Korea,
but Russia is trying to regain influence in the international community. Russia’s recent situation
with Ukraine has led western nations to enact sanctions on Russia. Due to these sanctions, Russia
has been isolated to western nations, such as the United States and even the European Union
(Talmadge, 2015). In addition, Russia historically did not have bargaining power with the United
States and Japan during the Six Party Talks and other general issues. Therefore, due to Russia’s
recent isolation with sanctions and past talks with Six Party members, Russia sees an opportunity
with North Korea. By Russia building a relationship with North Korea, Russia not only benefits
economically, but Russia is able to gain power in negotiations when dialogue involves North
Korea (Talmadge, 2015). Russia also could potentially be a third-party intermediary between
China and North Korea and a key to reopening the Six Party Talks because China and North
Korea have been having disagreements lately (Panda, 2015).
As for North Korea, the nation sees a relationship with Russia as an economic
opportunity and a chance to lessen dependence on China (Talmadge, 2015). North Korea has had
economic issues for years and heavily traded with China in order to somewhat ameliorate those
economic problems; although recently, China and the DPRK have been having disagreements.
By North Korea working with Russia, the former is not only able to receive some economic
benefits from a country other than China, but the DPRK is also able to move away from its
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dominant alliance (Talmadge, 2015). Some critics see this new relationship with Russia and the
DPRK as a threat to re-establishing the Six Party Talks and dealing with North Korea’s nuclear
weapons program, but others also see this relationship as an opportunity to persuade the DPRK

to return to the Six Party Talks and make concrete negotiations. Some critics also think President
Putin is working with North Korea just to bother the United States. Whatever President Putin’s
intentions are in this new relationship with the DPRK, Russia will want some benefits if it is to
develop a strong enough relationship with North Korea (Panda, 2015).
East Asia Region
The three Asian nations in the Six Party Talks—China, South Korea, and Japan—have an
interesting relationship because even though they convene for international matters, the nations
still have a tense relationship due to previously unsolved issues. China, South Korea, and Japan
used to have annual trilateral summits in which the nations discussed a variety of issues. These
summits ended in 2012, but began again in 2015 (Xu, 2014). An issue that is constantly
discussed during these summits is the nations’ history. China and South Korea are still bitter
about imperial Japan’s actions during World War II (Tiezzi, 2015). For example, China and
South Korea are still angered by Japan’s “comfort women,” in which Japanese soldiers
kidnapped Asian women for sex slaves (Tiezzi, 2015). World War II was over 70 years ago, but
for these Asian nations, this history still feels recent. Japan also has issues with China and South
Korea regarding discrimination and nationalism accusations and territorial disputes of islands,
such as the Senkaku Island or Diaoyu Islands (with China) and the Liancourt Rocks (with South
Korea) (Chitaia, 2014).
Japan is an interesting actor in this region because even though it has issues with China
and South Korea, both South Korea and Japan are close allies with the United States. Before and

during the Six Party Talks, the United States constantly encouraged its allies to cooperate
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because North Korea’s nuclear program was of common interest to them (Chitaia, 2014).
Recently, there also have been suggestions encouraging President Obama to use his Pivot to Asia
policy and ameliorate relations between South Korea and Japan. However, South Koreans fear
and dislike the Japanese more than they do the Chinese, and this “Japanophobia” (anti-Japanese
sentiment) in South Korea is widespread (Kelly, 2014).
As for China and South Korea, the two nations have historical conflicts of their own
regarding territorial and militarily disputes, but recently they have been able to have bilateral
discussions and bring their relationship to a different stage (Kelly, 2014). An issue that
frequently comes up is South Korea’s relationship to the United States. Because of North
Korea’s nuclear weapons and South Korea’s absence of nuclear weapons and overall military
protection, the United States has deployed troops to South Korea (Kelly, 2014). The United
States and South Korea also conduct military exercises together. The US troops’ presence and
military practices with South Korea worry China that the United States is not only trying to
contain China’s rise, but the United States will also become more involved in issues that are
mainly the concern of East Asia (Kelly, 2014). Even with South Korea’s alliance with the United
States, South Korea tries its best to have relations with China, due to trade, geographical
location, regional influence, and China’s relationship with North Korea. It may seem that
members of the Six Party Talks just need to persuade the DPRK to denuclearize, but with the
Asian countries’ relationship being somewhat complicated, the goal of a denuclearize North
Korea is more difficult than it appears.

Other Options:
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Tougher Sanctions
One possible policy, other than “Chinese Chess,” is to enact additional and tougher
sanctions on North Korea. Currently North Korea has several sanctions from the United Nations,
the United States, and other nations that affect various areas, including banking, travel, and trade
(Legislative, US Department of Treasury, 2011: 1). For example, there is an embargo on arms
and related material, a ban on exports of luxury goods and other goods listed by the United
Nations, a freeze on funds and economic resources, etc. (Legislative, US Department of
Treasury, 2011: 2). The purpose of these sanctions is to hurt North Korea’s overall well being
enough for the nation to give into the demands of denuclearization.
Even though the United States has used sanctions in the past and even in the present, with
the North Korean Sony hacking incident, sanctions have their own consequences. First, sanctions
are costly, and North Korea’s nuclear issue is not the only foreign matter the United States needs
to address. Second, sanctions have not fully worked in the past. Previously when North Korea
was punished for its nuclear testing with sanctions, North Korea reacted as expected by returning
to the Six Party Talks and asking for negotiations, but those negotiations never developed into
real actions (Edwards and Lange, 2015). The Obama Administration has used sanctions on Iran
and Russia and received great outcomes, but for years sanctions have produced little to no good
results with North Korea (Edwards and Lange, 2015). North Korea has been dealing with these
sanctions for over 60 years, so the nation knows how to survive with sanctions. North Korea also
does not react readily when thousands of its people are starving or do not have electricity;
therefore, a few more sanctions that try to hurt the DPRK are not really a big deal to the Kim
regime. Some critics say the sanctions do not persuade North Korea to change its ways, but only

make the country want to stick with its methods and continue to develop its nuclear power
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(Edwards and Lange, 2015). China poses another problem with sanctions. China accounts for
40% of North Korea’s trade, and even when the sanctions were enacted, China did not fully
implement all of them in fear of completely demolishing the country (Fackler and Sang-Hun,
2009). China does not want to completely collapse the Kim regime because of the problems that
would develop. Even though the DPRK may be hurt from the lack of trade with other nations,
China is not completely halting its trade with the DPRK anytime soon (Fackler and Sang-Hun,
2009). If sanctions were to be the solution to denuclearize North Korea, then it can only be a part
of the solution, not the entire solution.
Another Round of Six Party Talks
An additional policy option is to have another round of Six Party Talks. The six countries
would convene again to discuss North Korea’s denuclearization. There are a few problems that
may arise if the Six Party Talks were to convene again. First, history might repeat itself. In
previous Six Party Talks, North Korea made agreements with the five other members, but never
completely honored their promises. Convening the Six Party Talks also may allow North Korea
to manipulate countries against each other again because the talks would show that the Obama
Administration is not following its own policy of Strategic Patience (Fisher, 2013: 1). By
following Strategic Patience, the United States will not negotiate with North Korea until tangible
moves are made by the DPRK towards dismantling its nuclear weapons program. If the United
States were to reopen the Six Party Talks, it would appear that the United States is somewhat
giving into North Korea’s nuclear ways and disregarding its hardline policy (Fisher, 2013: 1).
This possibility too could lead to history repeating itself with broken promises from North
Korea. Some critics believe that having another round of Six Party Talks without a new plan

among the five nations is a mistake because the countries will just be arguing about the same
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issues (Fisher, 2013: 2). Other critics believe that dialogue is always good and even though a
complete agreement may not come out of the discussion, talking is better than ignoring the issue
(Fisher, 2013: 2).
Support and Opposition:
Support
Political parties that would support the policy of Chinese Chess are the Republicans and
Democrats although Republicans probably would be more in favor of the policy than Democrats.
Both political parties recognize that North Korea’s nuclear weapons program is an issue that
needs to be addressed, but more Republicans than Democrats view China as a powerful leverage
tool (Broder, 2013). More Republicans than Democrats also do not agree with President
Obama’s policy of Strategic Patience because Republicans believe North Korea will continue to
develop its nuclear weapons program in the meantime (Broder, 2013).
As for the United States, the majority of American citizens would support the policy of
Chinese Chess. A poll conducted by Pew Research Center in 2013 concluded “56% of
Americans view North Korea’s nuclear threats as very serious” (Bowman and Rugg, 2013).
Forty-six percent of Americans also believe that North Korea’s nuclear situation “can only be
resolved using economic or diplomatic efforts”; therefore, having discussion about future efforts
would be agreeable to American citizens (Jones, 2013). As for the Americans’ view about China
in general, 53 percent of Americans’ opinion about China is “favorable” (“China,” 2014).
Seventy-one percent of American citizens and 85 percent of US opinion leaders also find the
relations with China to be “very important/somewhat important” (English, 2012). The United
States’ overall favorable opinion of China and desire to strengthen its relationship with China is
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due to the latter’s position in the world. China is a rising power in the world, a great influence in
the East Asia region, the second largest economy in the world, and one of the fastest growing
economies; consequently, the United States sees the benefits and the need to work with a world
power.

As for China, the country views the United States in a similar manner because the US is a
global hegemon with the largest economy in the world; thus, China wants to develop its
relationship with the United States. China would not oppose having open discussions with the
United States about North Korea’s nuclear weapons program because China is concerned about
North Korea’s nuclear capabilities (Fackler and Sang-Hun, 2009). These open discussions could
also lead to dialogue about other matters, such as China’s concern about the United States’
policy of the Pivot to Asia. Simple conversations could lead to better understandings and
relations, future plans, and eventually binding agreements that could begin to denuclearize North
Korea.
Opposition
As previously mentioned, Republicans are more likely to support the policy of Chinese
Chess than Democrats. Democrats are more likely to oppose the policy because they do not see
China having as much leverage with North Korea as China did in the past (Broder, 2013).
Democrats are also more likely to oppose the policy of Chinese Chess because they support the
Obama Administration’s policy of Strategic Patience. By the United States having discussions
with China, it would seem that the former is ignoring its own policy because the United States
would be addressing the DPRK issue without North Korea making genuine efforts towards
denuclearization. Therefore, Democrats are more likely to support the president in the policy of
Strategic Patience.

Other possible critics of Chinese Chess would be Japan and South Korea. Japan could
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oppose the policy due to its absence at the meeting itself. Japan’s concerns in regards to North
Korea’s nuclear program have been ignored in the past, and the former does not have much
leverage when dealing with North Korea. By the United States and China having bilateral talks,
Japan may think it is being excluded again, and that the United States and China will make plans
that could potentially ignore Japan’s needs or potentially hurt Japan. As for South Korea, the
country may feel excluded as well, but its relationship with China is better than Japan’s
relationship with China; therefore, South Korea might not be as worried that bilateral talks
between the United States and China would affect South Korea negatively. Overall, however,
North Korea’s nuclear weapons program is of great concern to both Japan and South Korea;
hence, any open dialogue among members of the Six Party Talks should not cause that much
opposition unless binding agreements are made without other countries’ involvement.
China would be an advocate for the policy, but China could also be an opponent for the
policy because the country does not want to pressure the DPRK too much. China is the DPRK’s
closest ally and the former does the most business with the latter; however, China does not want
to push the Kim regime to the point where the DPRK could collapse or make poor judgments.
For example, China does not want North Korea to launch another missile or anger the DPRK
into further isolation. Chinese Chess is an open dialogue to discuss the issue at hand and slowly
work towards a plan; therefore, China would not see any harm in simple and non-binding
discussions.
Conclusion:
The current policy of Strategic Patience, or the other policy options of stricter sanctions
or the Six Party Talks, is not the best route for denuclearizing North Korea. Strategic Patience
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makes the United States a passive actor, and the options of stricter sanctions and Six Party Talks
have failed multiple times in the past. As the United States has previously seen, the Kim regime

is not going to denuclearize its state through demands and threats, and the DPRK will continue to
develop its nuclear program even when it is being ignored. Even with North Korea’s increasing
relationships with other countries in the East Asia region, China is still an important nation for
the DPRK’s well being. With this changed relationship between China and North Korea, and
other factors previously mentioned, it is the best time for the United States and China to develop
a plan that will work towards denuclearizing the DPRK. By the two most influential nations in
the situation working together, the United States and China can figure out how to approach North
Korea in a way that is different and more successful than before. A developing plan could
eventually incorporate other Six Party members and even tangible agreements. But if the United
States does not end its passivity in this situation, North Korea will continue to develop its nuclear
weapons capability and become a greater threat to the United States and to the East Asia region
in the future.

Public Opinion Memorandum
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Summary:
North Korea’s nuclear program is an international issue that has been occurring for years
and involves several nations and international organizations, such as the United Nations and the
International Atomic Energy Agency. Because North Korea, reckless and disobedient, broke the
Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the international community wants
the DPRK to immediately end its nuclear program. Americans are the most concerned about
North Korea’s nuclear weapons and believe that China could have a vital role in ending the
nuclear development due its relationship with North Korea. However, China is critical on the
role it would play in this issue. China is wary of North Korea’s nuclear development, although
China does not want to pressure the Kim regime to the point where it could possibly collapse.
South Korea is also another international actor involved due to its history with North Korea. In
the past, North and South Korea viewed each other as enemies, but today the countries have a
more cooperative relationship. Similar to China, South Korea is concerned with North Korea’s
nuclear program and well being as a whole. North Korea’s nuclear weapons program is an
international issue, but the way to denuclearize North Korea varies among the international
community.
Background and Discussion:
Americans’ View of North Korea
In a poll conducted by Gallup in February 2014, Americans were asked, “What is your
overall opinion of North Korea?” In the results of this survey, North Korea was the least
favorable country among 22 prominent nations with 11 percent of Americans viewing North
Korea as “mostly favorable” (Wilke, 2014). Over the years, this number has slowly decreased.

Iran used to be the least favorable nation among Americans; however, with the recent North
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Korean missile tests and uncooperativeness, North Korea has evidently taken Iran’s position.

In the aftermath of North Korea’s 2013 missile test, the think-tank Pew Research Center
asked Americans, “How seriously should the United States government take North Korea’s
threats to use nuclear missiles against the United States?” Fifty-six percent viewed the threats as
“very serious,” while five percent said “not at all serious” (Bowman and Rugg, 2013). As followup questions, Pew also asked Americans, “Do you think North Korea’s leadership is willing to
follow through with these threats,” and “Do you think North Korea is capable of launching a
nuclear missile that could reach the United States” (“Public Divided Over North,” 2013)? In both
polls, Americans were split with 47 percent believing that North Korea is willing to follow
through with its threats and is capable of reaching the United States with a nuclear missile
(“Public Divided Over North, 2013”).
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Forty-six percent of Americans also believed that this situation with North Korea “can be
resolved using only economic or diplomatic efforts,” while 51 percent believe it “cannot.”
Another Gallup poll in 2013 listed different subjects of concern, and Americans were asked how
much those issues were a critical threat. This poll was conducted before North Korea’s third
missile test, and 83 percent of Americans already viewed North Korea’s nuclear development a
“critical threat,” while 16 percent viewed the issues as “not important” (Jones, 2013).
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While a majority of Americans look negatively at North Korea, and the former is split
regarding North Korea’s capability and threat as a nuclear nation, it seems that older generations
take North Korea’s nuclear threat more seriously than younger generations. About 61 percent of
50-64 year-olds and 65 percent of 65+ year-olds considered the threats “very seriously,”
compared to 45 percent of 18-29 who viewed them as “very serious” (“Public Divided Over
North,” 2013). This difference may be influenced by the fact that the older generations fought in
the Korean War, or that the Korean War is more of a recent event for these individuals, unlike
the younger generations who were not born during that time period. As for political parties, 64
percent of Republicans, 52 percent of Democrats, and 57 percent of Independents view North
Korea’s nuclear threat as “very serious” (“Public Divided Over North,” 2013). This public
opinion poll was also taken by Pew after some missile tests in 2013. As previously mentioned,
Americans and its political leaders are split on the importance of North Korea’s as a nuclear
threat; however, there are spikes in opinion polls when North Korea tests its nuclear missiles or
threatens the United States in general.
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North Korea’s Views of the United States
Since the North Korean government controls what its citizens can and cannot know, there
is little statistical data collected regarding the population’s opinion. The government manipulates
data and news distributed to its people through propaganda, and the Internet is only accessible to
high-ranking government officials. In the past when the United States responded to North
Korea’s nuclear testing through diplomacy or sanctions, North Korea typically ignored the
United States’ requests or spoke out with hostile comments. After the March and April 2013
nuclear tests, Kim Jong-un spoke out against the United States stating,
[If] enemies [United States] make the slightest movement, I will give an order to destroy
the military bases of the U.S. imperialist aggression forces in the operational theatre of
the Pacific… there is a need to destroy the enemies without mercy… and the U.S. is the
arch criminal threatening peace. (Frieder, 2013)
This Anti-American belief is taught to the North Korean population through several ways, and
the lessons begin with the Korean War. From an early age, North Koreans are taught that the
United States is an imperialistic nation that decided to take over North Korea. This incorrect
depiction of history continues with the nuclear missile tests. North Korea’s leaders brainwash the
population to hate Americans by solely blaming the sanctions for North Korea’s poor conditions.
Because the United States and other international actors enacted sanctions on North Korea due to
the missile testing, North Korea’s leaders claim that its nation’s poverty, famine, economic
problems, and lack of electricity are caused by the “unnecessary” sanctions (Frieder, 2013). This
information brainwashes the North Korean population into thinking that its nation’s nuclear
program is to protect their country and that it is not adding to the nation’s demise. After the
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partial release of the film The Interview in December 2014, in which two Americans attempt to
assassinate leader Kim Jong-un, tensions between the United States and North Korea have

increased. As result of the release of the film, North Korea launched a cyber-attack on the film’s
production company Sony. North Korea’s Policy National Defense Commission also released a
statement in response to the film. In the statement, North Korea asserts that the United States is
“reckless” and “a cesspool of terrorism” and describes the storyline of the film itself as “vicious
and dastardly” (Walker, 2014: 1). Since the Korean War, in general North Korea has not viewed
the United States in a positive light, and the citizens have also been convinced of the same belief.
With the United States and international community attempting to halt North Korea’s nuclear
weapons program and the recent events regarding Sony’s film, North Korea views the United
States as a major threat to its security.
U.S. – China Relations
For years, China has been North Korea’s closest ally and lifeline in several ways. Since
the proposed U.S. policy is to use China’s relationship with North Korea in order to halt North
Korea’s nuclear program, it is vital to know how this policy could possibly impact current U.S. –
China relations.
Every year Gallup conducts public opinion polls to determine Americans’ views on
China. In 2014, about 53 percent of Americans’ said their overall opinion of China was
“favorable,” while roughly 43 percent of Americans said their opinion was “unfavorable”
(“China,” 2014). However in a survey conducted by Gallup in 2013, Americans were more
specific about the relationship they had with China. When considering China as an “ally” or
“enemy,” 11 percent of Americans saw China as an ally, and 14 percent saw China as an enemy
(Jones, 2013). As for a term looser than “ally” and “enemy,” Gallup asked Americans if they

viewed China as “friendly, but not an ally” and “unfriendly.” Results of this survey showed 44
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percent of Americans viewed China as “friendly, but not an ally,” and 26 percent of Americans
viewed China as “unfriendly” (Jones, 2013). This general positive outlook Americans have
regarding the United States’ relationship with China is largely affected by China’s role as a
world power and influence on the economy. There have been polls that asked Americans who
could potentially be the next great “superpower” or essential economic actor, and most times,
China was always mentioned. In 2014, 52 percent of Americans viewed China as a “leading
economic power” while 31 percent viewed the United States as a “leading economic power”
(Dugan, 2014).

Because of China’s upcoming role as a leading power, Americans believe a friendly relationship
with China is necessary. Seventy-one percent of Americans and 85 percent of U.S. opinion
leaders found the relationship with China to be “very important/somewhat important,” and 10
percent of Americans and six percent of U.S. opinion leaders found the relationship to be “not
important at all/not very important” (English, 2012).

Issues such as cyber-hacking, trade practices, and North Korea’s nuclear program are issues that
are constantly mentioned, and China is a significant actor in these situations; therefore, a stable
relationship between China and the United States is needed in order to solve these problems
(Jones, 2013). These are also the same reasons as to why Americans might be uneasy about
working with China. China is an upcoming economic and military power and supports North
Korea, a nation that is potentially a threat and enemy to the United States.
While the United States has an overall positive opinion about China, China might
actually be a little more cynical towards the United States and its policy focusing on Asia. In the
spring of 2014, Pew conducted a study to find out which nations were the greatest ally and threat
to a given nation. The top choice of “ally” for China was Russia with 25 percent, and the top
choice of “threat” for China was the United States with 36 percent (“Chapter 4: How Asians,”
2014). For the United States, the top choice of “ally” was Britain with 31 percent, and the top
choice of “threat” was Russia with 23 percent (“Chapter 4: How Asians,” 2014). President
Obama’s policy known as the “Pivot to Asia” has the United States turning its focus and
resources towards East Asia in order to create a closer relationship with the region, including
nations such as China; while the Obama Administration claimed this policy to be a collaboration
of two influential regions, China sometimes sees this policy as a threat to its dominance and

security in the region. One major issue for China is the United States’ military presence in the
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region. For years China has been disputing other nations in the region for occupancy of certain
islands, including Japan and the Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands (Schiavenza, 2013). The Pivot to
Asia has increased the amount of military bases in the region, and although the Obama
Administration says the military presence is to create stability in the region, this action has
created tensions with China. For example, the United States has sent B-52 bombers through
China’s air defense zone and threatened to reevaluate its military positions if China extends into
the South China Sea (Denyer, 2014). In April 2014, President Obama also had a meeting with
U.S. allies Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines that purposely excluded China. President
Obama also created new defense treaties, which would last at least ten years, with Japan, islands
administered by Japan, (the same islands that are disputed with China), and the Philippines
(Denyer, 2014). Also having North Korea as an ally protects China’s northeastern border from
South Korea, which is home to about 29,000 U.S. troops. While the Obama administration
claims they are only trying to create stability, China’s leaders feel that the United States is
attempting to intimidate and pick sides in a territorial conflict that is of no concern to the United
States (Denyer, 2014).
Another major issue between the United States and China is the economy. China is one of
the fastest growing economies and is currently the second largest economy in the world behind
the United States. As a result of China’s growth and East Asia’s growth in general, the United
States enacted the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a free trade agreement between 12 countries
through the Asia-Pacific area (Schiavenza, 2013). The United States and China have not agreed
on many economic plans and China again feels that the United States’ presence in the region is a
check on China’s growing power; therefore, China has not accepted the offer to join

(Schiavenza, 2013). Politicians and analysts from both United States and China believe the
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military and economic issues arising in the region are the most important issues to handle. With
North Korea’s nuclear program coming into the picture more often, the United States and China
believe that the nuclear program is causing more tension in the region and allowing other issues
to be pushed aside. However, an interesting poll conducted by Pew in 2013 broke down China’s
population into certain age groups and asked them questions about the United States. The
research was divided by age, education, income, and area of residence. Pew then separated the
survey into different aspects of the United States such as “good feeling towards the U.S,” “like
U.S. ideas and democracy,” “think that U.S. ideas and habits being spread in China is a good
thing,” etc. (Schiavenza, 2013). A general trend in the charts was that the wealthy, young, and
urban Chinese people have a more favorable opinion of the United States than do the poorer,
older, and more rural Chinese citizens (Schiavenza, 2013).
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These results are interesting because not only are the older generations clearly getting older and
leaving prominent political positions, but more Chinese citizens are becoming better educated,
wealthier, and more likely to live in urban areas (Schiavenza, 2013). In response to this survey,
over time China’s opinion towards the United States should become more positive;
consequently, there is a future possibility of a stronger relationship between the United States
and China.
North Korea – China Relations
In the past, leader of China, Mao Zedong, described the relationship between China and
North Korea a relationship that was “closer than lips and teeth”; however, due to North Korea’s
recent missile tests and China’s new leadership under President Xi Jinping, the relationship

between North Korea and China has worsened. Overall, China wants North Korea to abandon its
nuclear program, pursue economic reform, and integrate into the international community, as
China had done in the past (O’Carroll, 2014). North Korea’s nuclear test in 2014 and the
execution of a top North Korean official, Jang Song Thaek, was the turning point for China –
North Korea relations (Lai, 2013). China believes that North Korea’s nuclear tests have seriously
harmed China’s security interests in Northeast Asia, and the purging of official Thaek was
detrimental because of Thaek’s interest in the reform of North Korea and the close relationship
with Chinese leaders (O’Carroll, 2014). With Kim Jong-Un’s reckless missile testing and
purging of vital officials, China views North Korea as a disobedient little brother. In the past,
China supported North Korea due to its geographical position as a buffer zone from South
Korea; however, because of military and technological advancements and better relations with
countries in the region, that reason is losing value. North Korea also refuses to reform its trading
practices in fear that the regime will be undermined. As a result of this refusal to reform,

economic and trade relations between the nations are losing vitality (O’Carroll, 2014). Due to
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China’s interest in trading practices, Beijing has been more open to working with Seoul due to
South Korea’s booming economy. Annual trips of government officials between China and the
DPRK have also decreased. In the past, every new term in the Chinese presidency would led to a
visit to North Korea; although, between 2013 and 2014, these visits have dropped to only two
visits (O’Carroll, 2014). China is beginning to realize the difficulties North Korea is creating for
the former in the international community; therefore, it is challenging to consider these two
nations “allies” as they once were (Lai, 2013).
Even though the relationship between China and North Korea may be slowly
deteriorating, the two nations are still friendly to one another. China still appreciates North Korea
as a buffer zone and does not want to see the DPRK’s regime fall due to issues that could
possibly follow (Lai, 2013). China is also North Korea’s main trading partner and aid donor;
hence, North Korea clearly does not want to end relations with China. However, China’s policy
toward North Korea has changed from a “pampering and protecting” policy, to a “broader
engagement” policy (O’Carroll, 2014). Overall, the relationship between China and North Korea
has changed from extremely close allies to simply a “normal relationship between states” for
self-interested reasons (O’Carroll, 2014).
South Korea
One international actor that is constantly involved with the issue of North Korea’s
nuclear weapons program is South Korea. North and South Korea split in 1945 at the end of the
World War II, and ever since the Korean War, the United States has been a close ally with South
Korea. In light of North Korea’s nuclear testing and alleged attack on South Korean ships, the
United States and South Korea feel that North Korea is a threat to South Korea. Gallup asked

Americans in 2013, “If North Korea attacks South Korea, should the U.S. help defend South
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Korea with U.S. military forces, or not?” Fifty-five percent of Americans responded, “yes,
should,” 34 percent responded, “no, should not,” and 10 percent responded, “don’t know/no
opinion” (Newport, 2013). In April 2013, Americans had split opinions about whether or not
North Korea would attack South Korea (Newport, 2013). At the same time, Americans also
believe it was unlikely that North Korea would attack the United States (Newport, 2013).

Americans do not have a real way of determining the probability of North Korea attacking South
Korea or the United States; however, Americans still believe they should aid South Korea
militarily if an attack were to happen. In 2012, the Chicago Council on Global Affairs conducted
a survey regarding the U.S. military bases in South Korea. Sixty percent of Americans believed
“the U.S. should have long-term military bases in South Korea,” and 37 percent of Americans
believed “the U.S. should not have long-term military bases in South Korea” (Bowman and
Rugg, 2013). By having some troops near North Korea, Americans feel that North Korea could
be better monitored and the United States could protect its allies.

Even though Americans see North Korea as a threat to South Korea, South Koreans do
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not feel as strongly towards this opinion. A survey by South Korea’s Unification Ministry found
that 58.2 percent of South Koreans believe that North Korea is a country “Seoul should and does
cooperate with” and 13.3 percent of South Koreans viewed North Korea as “hostile country”
(Keck, 2014). Even though South Koreans viewed North Korea as a “cooperative partner,” only
22.2 percent of South Koreans said they supported South Korea providing aid to the North
(Keck, 2014). There was also a split between South Koreans about whether or not Seoul should
deal with North Korea’s nuclear program through “a combination of dialogue and pressure” or
“dialogue and cooperation” (Keck, 2014). In 2014, South Koreans were also asked about
President Park Geun-hye’s policy regarding the North Korea relationship (in general, keeping a
cooperative relationship between North and South Korea), and 77 percent of respondents
supported her efforts and 70 percent also said they agreed that her recent assessment would be a
“bonanza for South Korea” (Keck, 2014). These statistical results might come at a bit of a
surprise due to the regions past history and recent missile testing; however, South Korea claims
other nations make the situation appear worse that it actually is. Due to North Korea’s countless
military threats over the years and the United States’ troops in the region, South Korea has begun
to somewhat ignore North Korea’s actions (Jang, 2013). South Korea is worried about North
Korea’s nuclear program and thought about developing their own program, but at the same time,
the South views the North’s actions as irrational behavior rather than actual threats. South Korea
wants to coexist peacefully with North Korea and even assist each other economically. East Asia
as a whole is rising economically, and South Korea would not mind seeing its neighbor, who
already brings some revenue to South Korea, being included in this (Jang, 2013). Although
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South Korea does want the DPRK to end its nuclear development, South Korea may not always
view North Korea as hostile, as do Americans and many others in the international community.
Conclusion:
Overall, the United States, China, and South Korea would like to see North Korea’s

nuclear program come to an end; however, the severity of the situation or how it is accomplished
varies among these key actors. It is not likely that North Korea will end its nuclear program
within the year due to recent sanctions and North Korea’s overall desire of security through
nuclear weapons. In reference to my policy recommendation, Chinese Chess, North Korea would
dislike the policy because the policy is trying to create a nuclear-free Korea Peninsula. China
could dislike the policy as well. China wants North Korea to halt its nuclear program for similar
reasons among the international community; however, China is critical about its role in any
diplomatic talks with North Korea. Previously, China has put pressure on North Korea, but the
former applies pressure in ways in which other nations might not agree. As for South Korea and
other international actors, they would agree with the policy. As mentioned previously, the
international community wants North Korea to end its nuclear development, and because China
is North Korea’s closest ally, many believe China could be a vital player in this issue. If China
were to approve the policy of Chinese Chess, I believe the international community would agree
with it as a whole because dialogue between the United States and China could eventually lead to
the inclusion of other Six Party members in the exchange, leading to concrete agreements. It is
more productive for the United States to have open discussions about steps or future plans
towards the denuclearization of the DPRK, instead of forcing North Korea to end its program all
at once or continue to ignore the nation with the policy of Strategic Patience.

Interview with Fred Carriere
Summary:
An interview with Fred Carriere highlighted the major concerns, possible options, and
current action for the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Carriere aligns more with
Thorson’s view than with Steinberg’s view; however, Carriere looks at the North Korean
situation from an economic and diplomatic perspective. Carriere feels that the United States’
current policy of sitting back and letting North Korea make the next move is not a pragmatic
approach. By not talking to other international actors, the situation is worsening, and North
Korea will continue to expand its nuclear program. Although, trying to be North Korea’s
“friend” will not solve the problem either. There needs to be incentives in this situation that will
persuade North Korea to change, while simultaneously building a relationship between North
Korea and the international community. Overall, Carriere believes economics and gradual
conversation are the keys to eventually ending North Korea’s nuclear weapons program.
Background and Discussion:
Introduction of the Interviewee
Fred Carriere is currently a Political Science researcher and professor at the Syracuse
University’s Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs. In the past, he was a PCI Senior
Fellow at the Korean Peninsula Affairs Center. He specializes in North and South Korean
foreign relations, geopolitics of Northeast Asia, Track II Diplomacy, and Culture and History of
the Korean Peninsula. Several times he has visited both North and South Korea, and he has
worked with the Koreans over a variety of foreign affairs.

Summary of the Interview
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Carriere begins to speak about U.S. and China relations because he believes this
relationship is an important one that will not only affect the situation with North Korea, but also
affect future international relationships and affairs. The United States and China have the same
goal of a denuclearized North Korea. Carriere states that China is more concerned with its
economic affairs with other nations in Asia than North Korea being a buffer zone. China and the
United States clearly have an economic relationship, but China wants to build a stronger one
with nations in its own region. China has vital trading partners, such as South Korea and Japan,
because of China’s dominant role in North East Asia in general. These economic relations are
something North Korea wants and needs in order to survive. Carriere believes at the end of the
day, nations, such as Japan and South Korea, will always work with China because they are right
next-door, which allows relations and affairs between these nations to be easier and more
practical; this too applies to North Korea. Due to China’s great influence in the region and
economic interests, China is a country with which the United States needs to work. When
Carriere mentions working with China, he does not think giving China a list of demands to
communicate to North Korea is going to work. The United States has done this in the past with
China as the middleman to North Korea; therefore, Carriere believes the United States should
simply speak with China to get the issue out on the table and begin forming ideas. This open
conversation would be a slow process and could take years, but working with China instead of
preventing its power and growth is the key to denuclearizing North Korea. For example, the
United States’ policy of the “Pivot to the Asia” is an action China feels is preventing its growth
and power. In order to address North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, the United States needs
to have a more diplomatic relationship with China.

Another reason why China would not want North Korea to develop nuclear weapons is
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the defense system that South Korea would develop. The industrial military complex drives
South Korea’s concerns because the South Koreans are nervous about North Korea’s increasing
nuclear power. Instead of South Korea obtaining a defense establishment, a defense
establishment is installed at a U.S. military base. China dislikes the United States becoming
involved in South Korea’s defense establishments because the former feels that the United States
is monitoring the nation’s missiles, which again refers back to China’s feelings about the Pivot to
Asia. Overall, China would like to grow as a nation and develop a more pragmatic relationship
with the United States and the nations around it, instead of being somewhat babysat by the
United States.
Carriere’s view about the North Koreans was similar to Thorson’s view. While Thorson
believed the United States should make peace with the North Koreans and begin building trust,
Carriere believes this is only somewhat true. Carriere agrees with Thorson that the United States
should build a relationship with North Korea and should not punish the latter because that
approach has not worked in the past. Instead, this relationship should be built on “diplomatic and
pragmatic means” (Carriere, 2015). Carriere explained that the United States and North Korea
are their own countries with their own needs, and one necessity of North Korea’s is an
economically stable and advanced environment. North Korea’s biggest trading partner is China,
but North Korea wants other partners too. North Korea’s trading with South Korea has almost
dried out, and North Korea’s sanctions scare off U.S. investors. As a result, North Korea has
begun trading with Russia, but Russia too has some sanctions from Western Europe that makes
trading difficult. Carriere claims North Korea reaching out economically is a benefit both to
themselves and the rest of the international community because “every action has a reaction”
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(Carriere). Carriere gives the example of South Korea after the Korean War. The United States

did not see South Korea as a future world power with one of the top economies in the world, but
that is exactly what South Korea is today. Carriere believes the same thing would happen to
North Korea if the international community gets involved because North Korea is not that
different from South Korea when it comes to culture, economics, natural resources, production of
goods and services, etc. Another economic plan North Korea could take advantage of is a free
trade zone in East Asia. Carriere claims a type of action, such as a free trade zone, could begin
mending relations with North Korea.
Carriere truly believes the United States does not care about solving anything with North
Korea, and our current policy of Strategic Patience is going to hurt the United States and the
international community in the future. The President of the United States cannot continue to say
that our nation will work diplomatically with North Korea, and then claim North Korea is only
trouble. All this talk makes the United States look unprofessional and persuades North Korea to
continue its nuclear power and stay in isolation. “Actions speak way louder than words,”
Carriere states, and all the United States’ “talk” in the past and current actions have failed. The
United States should begin working with and receiving advice from China, researching possible
economic incentives or other incentives, and forget punishing North Korea for breaking the NPT
agreement. In the past, the United States has tried to punish, threaten, and ignore North Korea,
and all of these actions have failed; therefore, it is time for a different approach, and this
approach begins with cooperating with China.
Conclusion:
Of the three individuals I have interviewed so far, Fred Carriere aligns most closely with
my policy. He believes the North Korean nuclear program is an issue that will take time to solve,

but it is also an issue than cannot be handled without China because China is a vital actor.

56

Thorson wants to approach the North Koreans and create a relationship, but Carriere wants to
create this relationship in a diplomatic way by presenting issues that are important to any nation,
such as economics or international relationships in general. I also think it is important to mention
that Carriere believes punishing North Korea is not a good idea because punishment clearly has
not worked in the past, which does not mean Carriere or I believe North Korea should run free.
However, trying to force North Korea to obey only certain demands is not realistic either. This
relationship building with China and a civilized cooperation with North Korea are going to
involve many conversations and a lot of trust building, but starting now is better than doing
nothing.

Interview with Justin Dunnicliff
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Summary:
An interview with Justin Dunnicliff highlighted the major concerns, possible options, and
current action for the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Dunnicliff explains that North
Korea’s nuclear program is not a threat to the United States, but rather an issue the United States
should just keep in mind. North Korea likes its position in the international community and the
conflicts it causes because that is the regime’s strategy of staying relevant in the world. As for
the United States working with China, Dunnicliff believes China likes its current position in the
situation as well. China benefits from its position; therefore, there is no reason for China to try to
end North Korea’s nuclear program unless there are better advantages. However, if talks were to
occur, China would be is the best country to include. Dunnicliff offers better approaches to
ending North Korea’s nuclear program, including the current, smaller negotiations occurring
between North Korea and other nations in the region and a meeting similar to the Six Party
Talks. Dunnicliff also talks about a possible reunification of the two Koreas, and the North
Koreans feelings towards an international interference of their homeland.
Background and Discussion:
Introduction of the Interviewee
Justin Dunnicliff works in the Office of Net Assessment located in the Pentagon in
Washington D.C. He describes his office as a think tank for the Department of Defense;
therefore, his office forecasts long-term issues and with this analysis, he advises the Department
of Defense as a whole. For example, in the past he has worked on military relations with Japan
and how that has changed over the years. Dunnicliff received his bachelor’s degree at the
University of Washington and his masters at Syracuse University in International Relations,

focusing on Global Security and Foreign policy with a regional focus on the Middle East and
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Central China. Lately his interests and work has been focused on Japan and its remilitarization.
Summary of the Interview
Dunnicliff beings the interview by explaining that North Korea and its nuclear program is
not a security threat to the United States. If North Korea were to ever launch a missile on the
United States, the former would be completely annihilated within 30 minutes. North Korea does
not have the technological capability of sending a missile that far, and the Kim regime knows
that launching a missile on the United States, or on any country in the region, would end poorly
for them. Even though the DPRK could easily reach Seoul and Tokyo, launching a missile would
be asking for a death sentence. Because North Korea knows it is not strong enough to ever
launch an attack, in order to stay relevant to other nations, North Korea developed its own
strategy. Dunnicliff claims that North Korea appears to be “ferocious, crazy, and weak” for a
reason (Dunnicliff, 2015). The DPRK appears ferocious because they have a nuclear facility and
have been testing missiles and creating conflicts with South Korea; therefore, this gives other
nations the impression that they have weapons and are not afraid to use them. Although, other
countries do not want to attack North Korea because the nation is weak due to its famine, energy
loss, and extreme poverty; for those reasons, a nation would appear heartless if it were to attack
North Korea. Finally, the DPRK appears crazy because of the situations mentioned above and
the way in which the Kim regime runs the country, particularly in its propaganda and interactions
with other nations. Based on this knowledge, Dunnicliff then explains how to engage with North
Korea. He explains that the nation has a fine balance between appearing ferocious, crazy, and
weak. Pushing one of these aspects too far could disrupt the balance, jeopardizing North Korea’s

credibility. North Korea is able to maintain this balance and stay relevant to the international
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community because the strongest countries in the world continue to pay attention to the DPRK.
Dunnicliff makes the claim that China might not have as much influence on North Korea
as everyone thinks it does. In the past, North Korea depended a lot on China for resources and
aid; however, now North Korea is constantly getting nations to play off each other. For example,
lately North Korea has been talking to Russia and making negotiations with Japan. The United
States has been paying attention to these discussions and becomes involved because it wants to
know what is happening with relations in the region. North Korea uses this strategy so the
regime can simply survive. The DPRK needs resources and aid in order to survive, and instead of
depending on China, North Korea is beginning to reach out to other nations. As for North Korea
wanting to join the international community for economic reasons, such as free trade, Dunnicliff
believes this might not occur. Carriere’s strategy of using economic incentives to get North
Korea to make negotiations may not work because in order to have a country become more open
to economic opportunities, would mean a nation’s information would be available to the world,
and outside information would enter the nation. Therefore, if North Korea were to try and open
its markets and work with other nations for economic reasons, information would be flowing in
and out of the country, which is something the Kim regime wants to prevent because the DPRK
operates on propaganda, and outside information would disrupt the Kim regime’s power.
Dunnicliff states, “In theory this is a good idea, but in reality, it will not work,” (Dunnicliff,
2015).
Dunnicliff continues to explain that China also likes its current position regarding North
Korea’s nuclear program. Because China does not see North Korea as a threat, but the rest of the

international community is worried about the DPRK, international actors reach out to China in
order to deal with North Korea. This situation allows China to have some leverage when
assisting other nations or making negotiations. If the nuclear program were to be solved, China
would lose this leverage. China is also not trying to be a global hegemon like the United States,
but only a global power and, as previously mentioned, solving the nuclear program would take
away China’s leverage and some of its power. If there are no additional or better advantages to
solving North Korea’s nuclear power, then China will stay in its current position.
Dunnicliff then begins to talk about the United States’ interest in the region. He explains
that because the United States is a global hegemon, this problem should not be solved for the
United States’ own benefit. He explains that the United States obviously would like it better if
North Korea did not have nuclear weapons, but the United States also likes having its presence in
the region. By having army bases in the East Asia region, it is easier for the United States to
monitor what is going on in the region and to also transport people and supplies to the. By the
United States monitoring North Korea’s nuclear situation and assisting allies in the region, these
duties give the United States good reasons to stay in the area. If North Korea’s nuclear program
was completely dismantled and North Korean became cooperative, the United States would lose
its reason for staying in the region. Many nations also feel uncomfortable with China being the
strongest country in the region; therefore, a US presence slightly eases that situation.
Dunnicliff also talks about possible actions that could be taken with North Korea and its
nuclear program. He believes the two Koreas are getting closer to reunification, but how this
could be done is unclear. Amends would need to be made by the DPRK for its past actions
towards South Korea, but again, Dunnicliff is unsure how all of this would be accomplished.
Dunnicliff also explains what would happen with a possible military attack. He mentions that

61

even though North Korea may not have an advanced nuclear program, it does have a strong army
with powerful conventional weapons. If any nation were to attack North Korea in a conventional

way, the former may run into problems. For example, if South Korea were to attack North Korea,
Seoul would be completely destroyed due to its close proximity to the DMZ (Korean
Demilitarized Zone) and its dense population. One aspect Dunnicliff talks about that has not
been mentioned before by other interviewees is the North Koreans’ possible reaction to outside
interference. If this situation was to happen and South Korean troops were to enter North Korea,
how would the North Koreans respond – relieved or furious? The international community is not
sure how influential the Kim regime’s propaganda is with they country’s own people and if a
type of invasion would be welcomed or rejected by the North Koreans. This situation also
applies to other dealings other nations may conduct with North Korea because the world does not
know how the North Korean people truly feel about their own government. However, Dunnicliff
believes the North Korean’s view of the Kim regime is mixed. The people somewhat believe and
trust the Kim regime, but they also fear it due to possible punishment. Therefore, Dunnicliff
believes the best way to approach North Korea is to have another round of Six Party Talks. He
explains, “Dialogue is always a good idea; it includes the appropriate parties and ideas are open
for discussion” (Dunnicliff, 2015). Also by conducting dialogue, China still feels important
because it is being included and its leverage can still be maintained. This way also allows the
United States to still work with China and other actors in the region. In addition, North Korea is
currently making economic agreements with Japan in order to receive aid and have more access
to the United States on a global level. As for Japan, the nation is making agreements for security
purposes. Agreements like this one with North Korea, and other nations in the region, creates
security and stability for the region as whole because North Korea will not be tempted to use its

nuclear missiles if it is in a beneficial contract. In combination with the Six Party Talks and
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minor agreements made with North Korea, Dunnicliff believes this is the best way to handle
North Korea and its nuclear weapons program.
Conclusion:
Dunnicliff’s perspective was interesting in that it touched upon other interviewees’
perspective in regards to the Six Party Talks, but his perspective had a twist to it, as he mentions
current agreements that could also help the situation. Dunnicliff also seems to be the most
relaxed about the situation in that he believes it is not an urgent matter. Since his job is to
forecast foreign issues in relation to security, similar to the North Korea nuclear situation, he
believes North Korea will not create huge problems in the future. Out of all the people I
interview, Dunnicliff feels the most strongly about somewhat maintaining the current situation, it
allows the United States to have a presence in the region without its security or well-being being
threatened.

Interview with Robert Murrett
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Summary:
An interview with Robert Murrett highlighted the major concerns, possible options, and
current action for the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Overall, Murrett believes China is
a vital actor in the situation; however, he also believes other nations who were in the Six Party
Talks are just as important. Murrett spoke a lot about relations with Japan and how he believes
Japan is an important country that needs to be included in talks. Japan’s relationship to other
nations in the region may affect policy or any other decisions made regarding North Korea.
Russia is another power the United States may be underestimating because even though
President Vladimir Putin may perform certain actions just to annoy the United States, the
relationship between Russia and North Korea should not be ignored. As for policy, Murrett feels
that President Obama’s policy of Strategic Patience is tolerable; however, more could be done in
addition to his policy. Murrett mentions how dialogue with the main actors is a good idea to get
policy started and relationships mended. Murrett also talks about how ideal it would be for North
and South Korea to unite as one Korea again.
Background and Discussion:
Introduction of the Interviewee
Robert Murrett is currently a professor at Syracuse University’s School of Law and
Deputy Director of the Institute for National Security and Counterterrorism (INSCT. He received
his masters in security at the Georgetown University’s National Defense Intelligence College. He
is also a staff member at the Institute for Defense Analyses and the Rand Corporation, a thinktank providing research and analysis to the United States Army. For 34 years, Murrett was a
career intelligence officer in the U.S. Navy where his areas of duty ranged from the Pacific,
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Europe, and the Middle East. He also served as Vice Director for Intelligence on the U.S. Joint
Chiefs of Staff, Director of Naval Intelligence, and Director of the National Geospatial
Intelligence Agency (NGA).
Summary of the Interview

Murrett begins the interview by explaining that North Korea is a regional issue; therefore,
the United States and North Korea are not the only nations to be involved. He says it is
intelligent to work with China because China has the most dealings with North Korea than any
other nation in the East Asia region. China has other issues with other countries in the region that
are more problematic than North Korea, and frankly, China likes North Korea’s instability.
Although China is worried that Japan could eventually have nuclear weapons if the United States
were to lessen its presence or leave the region all together. If the United States were to leave the
region, similar to South Korea, Japan would need to defend itself from North Korea, and it is
possible that one way for self-defense is to create its own nuclear weapons. However, North
Korea’s instability makes China an important figure to North Korea and the region as a whole,
and consequently, China might not be too eager to immediately solve North Korea’s nuclear
program. North Korea also gives China a military buffer zone against South Korea and the
Untied States because the US is constantly performing military practices with South Korea.
Next, Murett brings up Japan and its role in the region. Japan is an ally to the United States, but
the former has poor relations with China and South Korea due to past incidents. Murrett explains
these poor relationships are causing tension in the region, and the United States should be more
aware of these tensions and actually agree to peacekeeping activities among these nations. It is
more difficult to address North Korea’s nuclear program if the basic relationships needed are
having issues as well. As for Russia, it has an interest in the region as well due to military and
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economic interests. President Putin probably would align with North Korea to bother the United
States, but Russia does gain by having some relations with North Korea. Japan does not like
Russia’s presence in the region because of the Sino-Japanese War in the 1895 and 1945, issues
that are still very prominent to both nations. As for China and Russia, they have a mutual

relationship. Murrett explains that the two nations’ relationship is not “close as the United States
and Great Britain,” but the countries can at times work together for their own interests (Murrett,
2015).
Murrett also brings up the idea of an integrated Korea, which he honestly could see years
down the line. A way in which he believes unification would occur is similar to that of Germany
after World War II, known as the “German Model.” In the German Model, east and west
Germany simply fused together, and this is exactly what Murrett hopes to see happen to North
and South Korea; for the two nations to simply come together. Obviously, the Kim regime would
be out of power, and the unified Korea would continue to perform and govern like current South
Korea. Even though a unified Korea is ideal, Murrett still believes Pyongyang needs to make
amends with Seoul for its countless military attacks and nuclear threats. Seoul is the biggest
potential victim to North Korea’s nuclear program due to its location and the countries’
relationship with one another; therefore, North Korea’s actions cannot simple be forgotten. As
for Strategic Patience, Murrett believes North Korea should make amends to South Korea;
however, open conversations should begin, in addition to Strategic Patience. Murrett believes
something similar to the Six Party Talks would be beneficial because the dialogue would include
all important regional actors, plus the United States and Russia. In this type of discussion,
relationships between countries could be mended enough in order to create practical policy.
There is also no negative outcome that could come out of these conversations, as has been
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proven the previous Six Party Talks. The worst that could occur again is that North Korea makes
agreements with the international community and simply ignores the promises after the talks.
Conclusion:
Murrett’s overall view touches upon many of the perspectives of different individuals I
have interviewed so far. He somewhat agrees with the policy of Strategic Patience and the idea
of North Korea making amends with South Korea, like Steinberg, but he also is similar to
Carriere in that he realizes different nations have different practical interests, such as economics
and international cooperation. Although Murrett was the only interviewee so far to stress the
importance of the region as a whole and the relationships between East Asian nations. Japan in
particular is another ally of the United States’ that should not be forgotten about because of its
location and strength. Murrett agrees that having conversations with China is a way to work
towards halting North Korea’s nuclear program, but it is important to include other regional
nations, such as Japan, in the dialogues.

Interview with Chang-Hoon Shin
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Summary:
Interview with Chang-Hoon Shin highlighted the major concerns, possible options, and
current action for the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Shin’s view on the situation is
different from the other interviewees, yet touches upon topics others mentioned. He agrees with
the interviewee Jim Steinberg about the United States policy of Strategic Patience. Shin also
explains why he does not believe China is the key in denuclearizing North Korea and that other
incentives, such as economic development will not persuade North Korea either. Shin discusses
more about the dynamic during the Six Party Talks, and why this dynamic along with North
Korea’s manipulation lead to failing agreements. Shin does agree with the majority of
interviewees that dialogue could never hurt, and that this goal of denuclearization is going to take
an extremely long time; therefore, it is more realistic to have regular discussions and create
smaller steps towards this goal of a denuclearized Korean Peninsula. He also mentions methods
that many other interviewees do not reference, in regards to handling the North Koreans. These
strategies may be influenced by his culture, because Shin is South Korean and works in the
country’s capital, Seoul. Overall, Shin does agree with the current policy of Strategic Patience,
but he also believes additional steps may be taken in order to ameliorate the problem.
Background and Discussion:
Introduction of the Interviewee
Chang-Hoon Shin is currently a research fellow in the Nuclear Policy and Technology
Program and the director of the Center for Global Governance at the Asian Institute for Policy
Studies in Seoul, South Korea (Shin). In the past, Shin has taught public international law,
international organizations, international economic law, and the law of the sea at Seoul National

University and Myongji University. His research focuses on dispute settlement, the law of the
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sea, international environmental law, international humanitarian law, and the study of the
nonproliferation regime (Shin, 2015). He received his Bachelor of Science (B.S.) and Masters of
Law (L.L.M) from Seoul National University and his Doctorate of Philosophy (D.Phil) at the
University of Oxford.
Summary of the Interview
Shin first talks about his opinion regarding my policy of Chinese Chess. He believes that
China is a significant actor in this situation; however, he does not think China is the key in fully
denuclearizing North Korea. He explains that in the past many political officials have
overestimated China’s leverage just because China and the DPRK are allies. Shin believes that
China has more power in preventing any act of proliferation to and from North Korea, but that is
about it. He says, “Realistically, the ending of the program is totally up to North Korea’s
political will for denuclearization” (Shin, 2015).
Shin then begins to talk about the dynamic of the Six Party Talks, a topic not discussed
by man other of my interviewees. He explains that when one envisions the Six Party Talks,
he/she would think it was the five nations against North Korea, although, the discussion and
alliances became more complicated. There were two triads: China, Japan, and South Korea
versus North Korea, China, and Russia. There were constant debates between the two triads,
instead of debates between the five states and North Korea. Even within the triad of the United
States, Japan, and South Korea, their “cooperation, solidarity, and bargaining power” was not
strong enough to create concrete negotiations with the DPRK (Shin, 2015). During the talks,
North Korea was able to distract the triads with other issues that led to the five parties arguing
amongst themselves and completely forgetting the original intent for the meeting. For example,

North Korea brought up the history of Japan abducting Koreans during World War II, and this
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led the discussion completely off topic. Shin’s point about the Six Party Talks is that the five
states need to coordinate and “mediate their interests as an honest broker like Germany in the
Iran Deal” (Shin). Overall, China is an important actor, but Shin feels that the coordination of the
five members is more important in the goal of a denuclearized North Korea.
Shin brings up a problem he believes many analysts ignore, which is the presumption that
North Korea may voluntarily give up its nuclear weapons program. He explains that North Korea
is not Iran, which is another mistake analysts make. Iran had to give up its nuclear weapons
because the sanctions were hurting Iran’s economy and well being too much. With North Korea,
the sanctions clearly do not hurt the DPRK enough for it to halt its nuclear program. For years,
many sanctions have been enacted on North Korea, and the DPRK continues to develop its
nuclear program. If the sanctions were lifted from Iran, then Iran would have become more
prosperous, but this is not the case for North Korea. The Kim regime’s strategy of isolation has
been occurring for years and the DPRK is still able to survive economically; therefore, there is
not much benefit for the DPRK’s economy if the sanctions were lifted. In other words, the Kim
regime believes that the potential economic gain is not enough of a benefit for the loss of the
DPRK’s nuclear weapons program.
As for the current policy of Strategic Patience, Shin agrees with the Obama
Administration’s method. He says there is no trust between the five states and North Korea due
to North Korea’s actions the past 20 years. He believes Strategic Patience is a good precondition
for North Korea and a good method to build that missing trust. Shin also explains that one policy
is not the best way to denuclearizing North Korea. Denuclearization is the ultimate goal, but
there is a long road ahead for that goal. He explains there are three ways to deal with North

Korea: coercion, dialogue, and deterrence (Shin, 2015). He believes these methods should
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constantly be used against North Korea until the DPRK finally decides to give up its program.
He also mentions another approach in handling North Korea, which is explaining to the Kim
regime the human factors of having a nuclear program. If the Kim regime were to know and
understand the human consequences in developing a nuclear program, then maybe the DPRK
may begin to halt its progress.
Conclusion:
Overall, I found Shin’s interview to be the most interesting because he is from South
Korea and has studied in the region for years. I thought he would have had a more direct plan or
bitter feelings about the DPRK, but he is actually extremely realistic about the situation. I think
in some ways he understands the North Koreans and even the Chinese well in this situation
because he sees the ultimate goal of denuclearization, but then he pays more attention to the
dynamics of the appropriate actors. It may seem that the world is against North Korea, but in
reality, relations been countries do not make that situation possible. Shin somewhat aligns with
my policy of Chinese Chess in that he believes dialogue could not hurt; however, he feels it is
best to include all Six Party members instead of only two members.

Interview with Jim Steinberg
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Summary:
An interview with Jim Steinberg highlighted the major concerns, possible options, and
current action for the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. While Stuart Thorson had a more
North Korean-friendly view of the situation, Steinberg believes it is North Korea’s job to make
some concessions and take responsibility for its actions if the DPRK wants the international
community to take it seriously as a country. The United States has tried to give North Korea the
benefit of the doubt in the past, but North Korea’s constant disobedience has given the
international community no reason to believe that North Korea is ready to earnestly end its
nuclear program. Steinberg stated, “Sometimes it’s better to do nothing than to do something…
and because the international community already tried making agreements with North Korea, the
ball is currently in their court” (Steinberg, 2015).
Background and Discussion:
Introduction of the Interviewee
Jim Steinberg is currently the Dean of the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public
Affairs at Syracuse University. He is also a professor of Social Science, International Affairs,
and Law at the Maxwell School. Before he became Dean in 2011, Steinberg was the principal
Deputy to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton under the Obama Administration. Steinberg was
also the vice president and director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution and
deputy national security advisor to President Bill Clinton. He recently published a book in 2012
about U.S. foreign policy focusing on Asia.

Summary of the Interview
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With Steinberg’s experience of security in the federal government, he takes the stance of
many U.S. security officials. Steinberg believes North Korea gives the international community
no reason to believe it is responsible with nuclear weapons and sincere in its agreements.
Steinberg explains that because North Korea joined the Treaty of the Non-Proliferation of
Weapons (NPT) and broke the agreements by creating nuclear weapons, North Korea must be
held responsible for its actions. Steinberg described the NPT as a safety agreement to prevent the
spread of nuclear weapons. Nations who join must get rid of their nuclear weapons (besides the
big six nations) and in exchange, nations with nuclear weapons will not threaten nations with no
nuclear weapons. After joining the NPT, North Korea was caught with nuclear weapons, but
instead of accepting the punishment, the nation continued its nuclear program. The international
community has made multiple efforts for North Korea to make amends and join the community,
but the country simply seems not to care.
While Thorson believes North Korea wants to be a part of the international community
and that the United States should stop acting in a paternalistic way, Steinberg believes North
Korea needs to be monitored and begin making amends. One way of showing sincerity is by
ameliorating relations with South Korea. South Korea is nervous about North Korea’s nuclear
weapons program and its constant threats along the DMZ border and in the water; therefore, by
connecting positively with South Korea, the United States will step forward as well and create
better relations with North Korea. South Korea has tried to mend relations in the past with North
Korea and the current president, Park Geun-hye, is currently making great efforts, but North
Korea continues to ignore these efforts. Steinberg feels that if North Korea cannot somewhat
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make peace with its neighbor, then the former will not cooperate with the rest of the international
community.
Steinberg also believes that Americans consider China as the potential savior of this
issue, but he disagrees with this assessment. North Korea distrusts China and the relationship is
no longer as close. China also does not want to get too involved with the issue because China
does not believe it would have much of an influence, despite the fact that many other countries
believe it could have a positive effect. Due to the weakened relationship between China and the
DPRK, Russia has more often been coming into the picture. Kim Jong-un plans on visiting
Russia in the spring and President Vladimir Putin is happy to welcome him. Steinberg believes
this meeting should not come as a surprise, because Putin would not mind troubling the United
States in any way. Creating relations and being friendly with North Korea is exactly the type of
action that would bother and possibly worry the United States.
Overall, Steinberg feels that North Korea wants to be in the position it is in. Kim Jong-un
controls North Korea with fear, and he already has created many enemies within his political
party and among his citizens. By having North Korea in isolation, it allows Kim Jong-un to

easily control its people. He does not want to be a part of the international community because he
does not want his citizens to see a better life, outside of North Korea, in a world without Kim
Jong-un as the leader. If North Korea were to begin to make little steps towards concessions and
limiting its nuclear program, then the United States and international community would
positively respond and begin making North Korea a part of the community. Steinberg believes
the Six Party Talks were successful in the past, and that if North Korea wanted to resume them, it
would have already. However, the way North Korea continues to act and move forward with its
nuclear program, the international community is going to continue to ignore North Korea,
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consider the nation as a threat, and the United States will remain in the region to protect its allies.
Therefore, Steinberg believes doing nothing at this time and simply waiting on North Korea’s
actions is a good way of dealing with the issue.
Conclusion:
Hearing both Thorson and Steinberg’s thoughts gave me interesting insight into North

Korea’s nuclear program because they both have completely different views. On one hand, North
Korea just wants to be a part of the international community, and on the other hand, North Korea
wants to stay in isolation because this is how the Kim regime maintains power. I actually
disagree with both experts’ opinions on the policy they recommend. I believe China is still a
major player in this situation because they have the most influence in the region, and China is
North Korea’s closet ally. Russia may be making relations with North Korea, but Putin would
never supply the resources and assistance to North Korea, as China once did. I do not think
sitting back and allowing North Korea to continue its nuclear program is eventually going to end
it. In order for the DPRK to eventually denuclearize, a lot of conversation and agreements need
to be made, and these issues cannot be discussed and agreed upon overnight.

Interview with Stuart Thorson
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Summary:
An interview with Stuart Thorson highlighted the major concerns, possible options, and
current action for the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Thorson believes that if the
United States wants North Korea to halt its nuclear weapons program, trust first needs to be built
in order for North Korea to even consider stopping its nuclear program. North Korea needs to
feel a part of the international community instead of being constantly punished when its ideals do
not match the United States’ ideals. Thorson also believes that ending North Korea’s nuclear
program all together and in a short amount of time is unrealistic because bonds need to be
formed first between the DPRK and the rest of the international community, specifically the
United States. Russia is also gradually coming into the picture because of its dominance in the
area nearby and North Korea’s need for aid from a nation other than China. Overall, the window
is closing for the United States and North Korea to build a solid or at least somewhat stable
relationship; therefore, the United States should act quickly and diplomatically if it wants the
nuclear program to at least decrease in size.
Background and Discussion:
Introduction of the Interviewee
Stuart Thorson is a Political Science and International Relations professor at Syracuse
University. Thorson represented Syracuse University in a collaborative research team with Kim
Chaek University of Technology, located in Pyongyang, DPRK. He was directing the research in
the area of integrated information technology and examined e-governance efforts regarding
privacy and security on the Korean Peninsula. Thorson has also been to North Korea and worked

with its leaders and views the DPRK government and its actions from a North Korean
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standpoint.
Summary of the Interview
Many Americans believe China should intervene and simply tell North Korea to end its
nuclear program because China is North Korea’s lifeline; however, Thorson believes China will
never intervene because China sees North Korea has a buffer zone from South Korea. The
United States and South Korea are constantly conducting joint military exercises, which make
North Korea feel threatened. If North Korea ended its nuclear program, China would be wide
open for an attack because that buffer zone would no longer exist. Nor does China like North
Korea’s nuclear weapons; however, China does not see a better course of action other than
simply staying friendly with North Korea. China also does not want to see North Korea because
there is already a current North Korean refugee issue. Every year, many North Koreans flee over
the border into China, and if the North Korean regime were to collapse, there would be an influx
of refugees.
Thorson claims that a major mistake the United States constantly makes is acting in a
paternalistic way. The United States and international community is enacting sanctions and
threatening North Korea to end its nuclear program. These paternalistic methods are only cutting
off North Korea even further from the international community and persuading the nation to
build up its defense in order to stay isolated. By the international actors telling North Korea what
it can and cannot do, North Korea questions the international community as to why they are
more responsible with nuclear weapons than themselves. Again, these choices of words or
actions make the DPRK feel isolated. North Korea is also still upset over the Korean War.
Thorson believes that the North Korean government views domestic and foreign affairs in legal

ways; therefore, to the North Koreans, the Korean War technically never ended because there
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were no treaties or agreements made. Through the North Korean’s eyes, the DPRK and the
United States is still somewhat at war.
Thorson suggested there are two major steps that should be done in order to build better
relations with North Korea. The first step for the United States is to create a serious effort in
ending the Korean War through a diplomatic mean, so North Korea can believe the war is
officially over. The second step is for the United States to make a movement of diplomatic
reconciliation. To create this diplomatic reconciliation, Thorson proposes sending some type of
U.S. representative to Pyongyang, the capital of the DPRK. This person does not have to be an
ambassador at this early stage, but this representative should be making regular trips to
Pyongyang in order to slowly build trust with North Korea. If relations do not go well, the
representative could always return to the United States.
Thorson claims that the current U.S. policy of Strategic Patience is worsening the
relationship between the United States and North Korea because by ignoring North Korea, the
United States is pushing the DPRK into further isolation. Thorson believes the United States is
running out of time for the opportunity to work with North Korea and dismantle its nuclear
weapons program because North Korea is looking for new allies. North Korea admires the
United States in its leadership, economy, and science advancements and is a tired of China
constantly being its “big brother”; therefore, now would be the perfect opportunity to begin
building trust. However, since the United States is continuing its policy of Strategic Patience,
North Korea is now meeting with Russia. According to Thorson, Russia has the oil supply to
help North Korea with its energy issues, and the former would gladly help the latter with
problems involving the United States. Like Russia, the United States also needs to take the

opportunity to work with North Korea. Thorson claims there are certain beliefs engraved into
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Asian culture, such as the idea of the affluent helping the poor. North Korea sees the United
States as the wealthier nation who has the obligation to help the poorer nation of North Korea.
Even if North Korea has nuclear weapons, it knows it does not stand a chance in a military
conflict against the Untied States; therefore, it is the United States’ duty to come forward and
initiate diplomatic relations.
As a final note, Thorson also refers to successful examples of diplomacy in a similar
situation regarding South Korea and China. He says that in the 1950s, these nations were similar
to North Korea in that they were acting in ways with which the Untied States did not agree,
including areas of interest such as human rights or military agendas. However, since former
President Richard Nixon opened relations with China and later the United States began working
with South Korea, both nations gradually built trust with the United States and became apart of
the international community. Many of the original conflicting issues gradually disappeared
because China and South Korea wanted to remain in good standing with the world. Today, both
nations are the top ten best economies in the world and are allies, or at least friendly companions,
to the United States. Thorson believes that if the United States began to accept North Korea into
the international community, 20 years from now North Korea’s nuclear arsenal would decrease
and the nation could possibly be allies with the United States.
Conclusion:
The interview with Stuart Thorson allowed me to look at the nuclear issues from North
Korea’s viewpoint. Most, if not all articles today are written in countries other than North Korea;
therefore, the articles are written in a way that always makes North Korea appear wrong. Since
Thorson worked with North Korean leaders and has been to North Korea, he understands how

the leaders feel about the nuclear issue. Thorson does not believe that North Korea has done
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everything correctly in the past, but he is able to give some insight into how the North Koreans
look at the situation. Overall, Thorson believes North Korea needs to be included into the
international community and feel like an in dependent nation before discussing its nuclear
weapons program.
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